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Blackmail remains one of the most difficult, and unsolved, puzzles in all of
law. While nearly all endorse blackmail's criminalization, no one can explain
why it should even be a crime. By introducing the novel concept of meta-
blackmail, this Article explains why the puzzle of blackmail-how it can be a
crime to conditionally threaten to do what one has a right to do-cannot be
resolved. While a conventional blackmail proposal backs a demand for money
with the threat to disclose the recipient's embarrassing secret, a meta-blackmail
proposal backs a demand for money with the threat to blackmail the recipient.
Thus, conventional blackmail threatens a lawful act (e.g., disclosure of an
embarrassing secret), but meta-blackmail threatens an unlawful act-blackmail
itself. The comparative assessment of meta-blackmail and conventional black-
mail reveals a trilemma: (i) since meta-blackmail threatens an unlawful act,
meta-blackmail is a more serious level of criminality; (ii) since both meta-
blackmail and conventional blackmail, in effect and function, demand money
for nondisclosure of an embarrassing secret, they are equivalent; and (iii) since
threatening blackmail should be less serious than actually committing black-
mail, meta-blackmail is less serious. The trilemma, which is best resolved by
decriminalizing blackmail, demonstrates that criminalizing blackmail violates a
number of intuitions that are more compelling than the intuition that blackmail




I. A CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE THEORIES OF BLACKMAIL ............. 750
A. CONSEQUENTIALIST ................................ 751
* Associate Professor of Law, The University of Tulsa College of Law. © 2006, Russell L.
Christopher. I am indebted to Larry Alexander, Mitchell Berman, Kathryn Christopher, Lyn Entzeroth,
George Fletcher, Kent Greenawalt, Alon Harel, Leo Katz, Janet Levit, Ken Levy, Peter Oh, Tamara
Piety, Joseph Raz, Ron Shapira, Steve Sheppard, and Ekow Yankah for their helpful comments and
criticisms. A previous version of this Article was presented at the Midwestern Law and Economics
Association annual meeting at Northwestern University School of Law and a Faculty Colloquy at The
University of Tulsa College of Law.
740 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 94:739
1. Blackmail as Economic Inefficiency ............... 752
a. Unproductive Exchange ..................... 752
b. Blackmailer's Waste of Resources ............. 755
c. Blackmailee's Waste of Resources ............. 756
2. Subsidiary Harms of Blackmail ................... 758
a. Blackmail, Inc ............................. 758
b. Blackmailee's Unlawful Self-Help .............. 759
B. NONCONSEQUENTIALIST ............................. 761
1. Wrong of Blackmail in One of Its Components ....... 762
a. Unlawful Threatened Acts ................... 762
b. Immoral Threatened Acts .................... 763
2. Wrong of Blackmail in the Combination
of Components .............................. 764
a. Relations of Domination ..................... 764
b. Evidence of Bad Motive ..................... 765
c. Use of Another's Bargaining Chips ............. 767
d. Coercion ................................ 768
I. META-BLACKMAIL AS MORE SERIOUS THAN BLACKMAIL ............ 769
A. THE FORMALIST APPROACH ........................... 770
1. Meta-Blackmail as Robbery ..................... 771
2. Meta-Blackmail as Coercive ..................... 772
B. PUZZLES ....................................... 773
III. META-BLACKMAIL AS EQUIVALENT TO BLACKMAIL ................. 774
A. THE FUNCTIONALIST APPROACH ........................ 774
B. PUZZLES ....................................... 775
IV. META-BLACKMAIL AS LESS SERIOUS THAN BLACKMAIL ............ 777
A. THE SUBSTANTIVIST APPROACH ........................ 777
B. PUZZLES ....................................... 779
V. CONSIDERING THE THREE APPROACHES ...................... 780
META-BLACKMAIL
A. HARMONIZING BLACKMAIL WITH ROBBERY ................. 780
B. RESOLVING THE PUZZLE OF BLACKMAIL'S CRIMINALIZATION ... 781
C. SUPPORTING DECRIMINALIZATION OF BLACKMAIL ............. 782
C ONCLUSION ............................................ 784
INTRODUCTION
The crime of blackmail' is "one of the most elusive intellectual puzzles in all
of law.",2 Despite blackmail being widely reviled as "moral murder,",3 "murder
of the soul,"'4 and "the most detestable of crimes,",5 no one can explain why it
should even be a crime.6 Explanations of blackmail have been proffered by
1. Popularly understood, blackmail is the "attempt to trade silence for money." Richard A. Posner,
Blackmail, Privacy, and Freedom of Contract, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1817, 1817 n.1 (1993). For similar
conceptions of blackmail, see, for example, 4 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW:
HARMLESS WRONGDOING 241 (1988), observing that blackmail is the "attempt to extract money or
advantage by means of a threat to disclose [embarrassing] information about the victim," and Joseph
Isenbergh, Blackmail from A to C, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1905, 1905 (1993), defining the central case of
blackmail as "the sale of silence by someone who is otherwise free to disclose what he knows." For
examples of blackmail which do not involve threatening disclosure of an embarrassing secret, see LEO
KATZ, ILL-GOTTEN GAINS: EVASION, BLACKMAIL, FRAUD, AND KINDRED PUZZLES OF THE LAW 134-37
(1996), which notes, for example, that "[play me $10,000, or I'll flunk you on this exam" qualifies as
blackmail.
Under some formulations, blackmail is considered a type of extortion. For example, the Model Penal
Code defines theft by extortion, in part, as follows:
A person is guilty of theft if he purposely obtains property of another by threatening to:
(1) inflict bodily injury on anyone or commit any other criminal offense; or...
(3) expose any secret tending to subject any person to hatred, contempt or ridicule,
or to impair his credit or business repute ....
MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.4 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985). The Model Penal Code
mixes both (what would commonly be understood as) blackmail (paragraph (3)) and extortion (para-
graph (1)) in the same theft-by-extortion statute. For criticisms of the Model Penal Code provision as
seriously overinclusive in criminalizing a considerable number of obviously permissible economic
transactions, see Douglas H. Ginsburg & Paul Shechtman, Blackmail: An Economic Analysis of the
Law, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1849, 1857-59 (1993), and James Lindgren, Unraveling the Paradox of
Blackmail, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 670, 710-13 (1984). By a convention in the literature, however, extortion
is often distinguished from blackmail by the former threatening an unlawful act (for example, future
physical harm) and the latter threatening a lawful act (for example, disclosing an embarrassing secret).
See, e.g., FEINBERG, supra, at 240-41; Steven Shavell, An Economic Analysis of Threats and Their
Legality: Blackmail, Extortion and Robbery, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1877, 1877 n.l (1993). For clarity, I
will use the term extortion to refer only to nonblackmail extortion, unless otherwise specified.
2. James Lindgren, Blackmail: An Afterword, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1975, 1975 (1993).
3. Ronald Coase, The 1987 McCorkle Lecture: Blackmail, 74 VA. L. REV. 655, 675 (1988).
4. Peter Alldridge, Attempted Murder of the Soul: Privacy and Secrets, 13 OXFORD J.L. STUD. 368,
382 (1993) (quoting R v. Hadjou, (1989) I1 Cr. App. R(S). 29 (Eng.)).
5. MIKE HEPWORTH, BLACKMAIL: PUBLICITY AND SECRECY IN EVERYDAY LIFE 20 (1975).
6. See, e.g., Leo Katz, Blackmail and Other Forms of Arm-Twisting, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1567, 1567
(1993) ("Nearly everyone seems to agree that blackmail is an indispensable part of a well-developed
criminal code, but no one is sure what for."); Jeffrie G. Murphy, Blackmail: A Preliminary Inquiry, 63
MONIST 156, 156 (1980) ("Most of us are inclined to believe that blackmail is clearly immoral (even a
particularly sleazy kind of immorality) and thus are quite content that it be criminalized. Justifying this
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many of the leading scholars of our time-all to no avail.7 Even the preeminent
economist Ronald Coase, after ruminating over blackmail since 1930,8 could
conclude only that "blackmail, like pornography, is difficult to define, but you
know it when you see it."9 Because of its profound and wide-ranging implica-
tions1° both within criminal law" and beyond,' 2 the blackmail puzzle has
triggered a stunning outpouring of interdisciplinary scholarship-criminal law
theorists, ' 3 moral philosophers, 14 judges, 15 political philosophers, 16 legal histori-
ans,17 and economists' "-endeavoring to find a solution.' 9 But the blackmail
belief, however, turns out to be more of a problem than it might at first seem."); David Owens, Should
Blackmail Be Banned?, 63 PHIL. 501, 501 (1988) ("There is no right to blackmail. So says the law and
so say most moral observers.... However, it is surprisingly difficult to say just what is wrong with
blackmail.").
7. Lindgren, supra note 1, at 671 ("Possible rationales for blackmail have been presented by some of
the leading legal scholars of this century, including Arthur Goodhart, Robert Nozick, Lawrence
Friedman, Richard Posner, and Richard Epstein. None, however, has successfully explained the
crime."); see also infra notes 20, 32. For additional leading scholars positing accounts of blackmail,
see, for example, sources cited infra notes 13-18.
8. Coase, supra note 3, at 665 (relating that he first began thinking about blackmail as a student in
"1929 or 1930").
9. Id. at 669.
10. See Mitchell N. Berman, The Evidentiary Theory of Blackmail: Taking Motives Seriously, 65 U.
CHI. L. REV. 795, 799 (1998) ("[T]he blackmail paradox is not merely a tantalizing intellectual puzzle.
The number and stature of minds it has attracted bespeak a widely held belief that a solution to this
single conundrum will bear broad and deep implications.").
11. See Lindgren, supra note 2, at 1975 ("The struggle to understand blackmail is a struggle for the
soul of the criminal law.").
12. Leo Katz and James Lindgren catalogue the wide variety of issues affected by the intractable
puzzle of blackmail:
[l]t has come to seem to us that one cannot think about coercion, contracts, consent, robbery,
rape, unconstitutional conditions, nuclear deterrence, assumption of risk, the greater-includes-
the-lesser arguments, plea bargains, settlements, sexual harassment, insider trading, bribery,
domination, secrecy, privacy, law enforcement, utilitarianism and deontology without being
tripped up repeatedly by the paradox of blackmail.
Leo Katz & James Lindgren, Instead of a Preface, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1565, 1565 (1993).
13. See, e.g., KAz, supra note 1, at 133-96; George P. Fletcher, Blackmail: The Paradigmatic
Crime, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1617 (1993).
14. See, e.g., FEINBERG, supra note 1, at 238-76; Murphy, supra note 6.
15. See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 95-103 (1981); Ginsburg & Shechtman, supra
note 1; Posner, supra note 1.
16. See, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 84-87 (1974); Michael Gorr, Liberalism
and the Paradox of Blackmail, 21 PHIL. & PUB. AnF. 43 (1992).
17. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Friedman, Name Robbers: Privacy, Blackmail, and Assorted Matters in
Legal History, 30 HOFSmRA L. REV. 1093, 1110-15 (2002); R.H. Helmholtz, The Roman Law of
Blackmail, 30 J. LEG. STUD. 33 (2001).
18. See, e.g., Coase, supra note 3. For prominent "law and economics" scholars addressing black-
mail, see, for example, Richard A. Epstein, Blackmail, Inc., 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 553 (1983); Posner,
supra note 1; and Shavell, supra note 1.
19. See, e.g., Berman, supra note 10, at 796-97 ("The so-called paradox of blackmail has garnered
an extraordinary degree of interdisciplinary scholarly attention. Contributors to the debate have
included law professors and judges, moral philosophers and economists."); Helmholtz, supra note 17,
at 34 ("The reason for the prohibition against what might be regarded as freedom of contract does seem
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puzzle has stubbornly resisted resolution. 20 This Article explains why: the
intuitions that criminalizing blackmail violates are more compelling than the
intuition that blackmail is properly criminalized.
The puzzle of blackmail is not whether blackmail should be criminalized, but
rather how or why blackmail should be criminalized.2' While Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes has intoned that "what you may do ... you may threaten to
do, 2 2 the law of blackmail declares that what you may do you must not
conditionally threaten to do.23 For example, in the canonical blackmail scenario,
mysterious, and the natural desire to hit upon a plausible explanation has proved inviting to a wide
variety of theoretical approaches.").
20. See FEINBERG, supra note 1, at 238 ("[l]t is disconcertingly difficult to show that [blackmail's]
prohibition satisfies the harm principle."); Coase, supra note 3, at 656 (noting "the lack of any
consensus among lawyers about the nature of blackmail"); Lindgren, supra note 1, at 670 ("Most
crimes do not need theories to explain why the behavior is criminal. The wrongdoing is self-evident.
But blackmail is unique among major crimes: no one has yet figured out why it ought to be illegal.");
Henry E. Smith, The Harm in Blackmail, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 861, 862 (1998) (observing that with
blackmail, unlike other crimes, "it is far more difficult to explain why the act is criminal than to identify
what is illegal").
21. The overwhelming majority of scholars find that blackmail is properly criminalized. See supra
note 6. For a small sampling of the scholars defending the view that blackmail is properly prohibited,
see sources cited supra notes 13, 15-18. For an extensive list of virtually all the scholars who defend
blackmail's criminalization, see Walter Block & Gary M. Anderson, Blackmail, Extortion, and Ex-
change, 44 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 541, 543 n.2 (2001).
For the very few scholars arguing that blackmail should be decriminalized entirely, see generally
MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, MAN, ECONOMY, AND STATE 443 n.49 (1962) (advocating for the decriminaliza-
tion of blackmail on libertarian grounds); Walter Block & David Gordon, Blackmail, Extortion and
Free Speech: A Reply to Posner Epstein, Nozick and Lindgren, 19 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 37, 37 (1985)
(same); Eric Mack, In Defense of Blackmail, 41 PHIL. STUD. 273, 274 (1982) (same).
For the very few scholars finding that only the paradigmatic type of blackmail should be decriminal-
ized, see Joel Feinberg, The Paradox of Blackmail, 1 RATIO JURIs 83, 94 (1988) ("In summary, I have
argued that only category 2 blackmail involving threats to warn the public of legally innocent
underhanded dealing need be legalized in order to preserve the overall coherence of a legal system.");
Isenbergh, supra note 1, at 1930 (endorsing decriminalization of blackmail involving threats to disclose
private information (not regarding a crime or a tort)); and Ronald Joseph Scalise, Jr., Comment,
Blackmail, Legality, and Liberalism, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1483, 1486-90 (2000) (agreeing with Feinberg,
supra, that blackmail in Feinberg's category 2 should be decriminalized). Jeffrie Murphy has also
hinted that blackmail should be decriminalized:
[Under one view] it will not be legitimate to make blackmail a crime, because a blackmailer
typically threatens to do things he has a full legal right to do, that is, circulate or publish true
information. I accept this and have indeed argued elsewhere that, in principle, blackmail
should not be a crime.
Jeffrie G. Murphy, Some Ruminations on Women, Violence, and the Criminal Law, in IN HARM'S WAY:
ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JOEL FEINBERG 209, 228 n.17 (Jules L. Coleman & Allen Buchanan eds., 1994)
(citing Murphy, supra note 6).
22. Vegelahn v. Guntner, 44 N.E. 1077, 1081 (Mass. 1896).
23. Virtually every jurisdiction criminalizes the attempt to obtain a material good or advantage upon
the issuance of a conditional threat to commit a lawful act (e.g., disclose an embarrassing secret). See
James Lindgren, Blackmail and Extortion, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 115, 119 (Sanford
Kadish ed., 1983). Prior to 1843, however, only threats to commit unlawful acts or to accuse a person of
committing an infamous criminal offense were prohibited in England. See HEPWORTH, supra note 5, at
14. Criminalizing the modem conception of blackmail (conditional threats to commit lawful acts) did
not occur in England until the Libel Act of 1843. See Alldridge, supra note 4, at 372.
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Blackmailer shows Victim pictures of Victim engaging in adultery and utters to
Victim the following proposal: "If you do not give me $1000, then I will
disclose your adulterous relationship." No individual component of the proposal
is unlawful. Blackmailer may permissibly request money from Victim; Black-
mailer may permissibly threaten to unconditionally disclose the adultery; and,
Blackmailer may even permissibly disclose the adultery. The two components
of a blackmail proposal (the demand of payment of money and the threat of
disclosure of a secret) are each independently legal but in conjunction are
criminal.24 While traditionally articulated as "[w]hy do two rights make a
wrong," 25 the preferable expression of the puzzle is why threatening to condition-
ally commit what is lawful to actually conmit should constitute a criminal
offense.26 Despite the individually lawful components, by some mysterious
alchemy proposing to condition the disclosure on nonreceipt of the money
Russell Hardin contrasts the origin of blackmail with its modem conception:
"[B]lackmail" meant the tribute paid by English dwellers along the Scottish border to Scottish
chieftains to secure immunity from border raids. "Mail" was then a wallet or traveling bag
and, by association, what was carried in such a bag, such as what we now call mail. "White
rent" was tendered in silver coin ("white money"); blackmail was payment in kind, for
example, in cattle or labor. If the protection the chieftains sold was protection against other
marauders, they offered merely an exchange of services for services. In that case, their offer,
while perhaps too good to refuse, was not like modem blackmail or extortion. If their
protection was from their own depredations, the chieftains were like the modem mafia. Their
offer of a deal was extortion. Such an offer is also unlike modem blackmail. Blackmail
typically lies somewhere between these two possibilities.
Russell Hardin, Blackmailing for Mutual Good, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1787, 1787 (1993) (footnotes
omitted).
Judge Douglas Ginsburg and Paul Shechtman locate the origin of blackmail as a criminal offense as
an attempt to plug a loophole in the common law offense of robbery. See Ginsburg & Shechtman, supra
note 1, at 1851-57. Robbery required that the theft be from the victim's person or in his presence.
Enterprising criminals found that they could accomplish a robbery in effect by sending a letter
containing intimidating threats. The frightened victim handed over his goods or money, but the letter
sender avoided robbery liability because of the absence of the "from the victim's person or in his
presence" element. Addressing this loophole, the Scottish Parliament passed two acts in 1567 and 1587,
the latter prohibiting "blak meill." Id. at 1851 & n.3 (citing Scot. Act., Jam. 6, ch. 27 (1567) (Scot.)
(outlawry); Scot. Act., Jam. 6, ch. 59, § 13 (1587) (Scot.) ("blak meill")).
24. See Glanville Williams, Blackmail, 1954 CRIM. L. REv. 79, 163 ("Together, the demand and the
threat constitute the crime of blackmail."); see also Smith, supra note 20, at 862 ("[B]lackmail consists
of a threat to reveal a secret on the one hand and a demand for payment to keep the secret on the
other.") (emphasis added).
25. Lindgren, supra note 2, at 1975. Glanville Williams, credited as being the first to express the
puzzle of blackmail in these terms, explained it as follows: "two things that taken separately are moral
and legal whites together make a moral and legal black." Williams, supra note 24, at 163. But two
rights making a wrong is fairly common within the criminal law. See, e.g., Michael Clark, There is No
Paradox of Blackmail, 54 ANALYSIS 54, 55 (1994) ("It is not in itself illegal to be drunk nor is it illegal
to be in charge of a motor car, but it is illegal to be drunk in charge of a car."); Wendy J. Gordon, Truth
and Consequences: The Force of Blackmail's Central Case, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1741, 1743 & nn.16 &
19 (1993) (arguing same).
26. For the other traditional puzzles of blackmail, see infra text accompanying notes 58-64, 216.
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constitutes the crime of blackmail.27 In contrast, threatening to conditionally
commit what is unlawful to actually commit (as in robbery28) is easily explained
as criminal and is not puzzling at all. 29 The difficulty in justifying blackmail as
criminal and the ease of justifying robbery's criminalization is thus a function of
the absence and presence, respectively, of a threatened act that is unlawful.3 °
Although numerous theories of blackmail have been advanced, no theory has
succeeded in placing the justification of blackmail's criminalization on the same
firm footing as the justification of robbery's criminalization.3 Moreover, no
account has even attracted an appreciable number of adherents.32
27. It should be noted that not all instances of blackmail are problematic. Blackmail is puzzling or
paradoxical where the threatened act is lawful and moral. See Lindgren, supra note 1, at 671 n.7
("Where what the blackmailer threatens to do is itself criminal, the criminality of blackmail is fairly
easily justified."); Smith, supra note 20, at 864 ("Blackmail as a crime has been a puzzle because the
illegitimacy of the blackmailer's threat is difficult to explain in general. But not all types of threat that
result in blackmail are equally difficult to explain as illegitimate.").
Following a convention in the literature, see supra note 1, I will use the term blackmail to denote
those proposals with lawful and moral threatened acts and the term extortion to denote those proposals
with an unlawful and immoral threatened act (not arising to the level of robbery). I will restrict my
discussion to only the problematic type of blackmail (where the threatened act is lawful and moral).
28. Robbery is a theft accomplished by the use of force or the threat of force. See, e.g., WAYNE R.
LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 870 (3d ed. 2000) (noting that robbery involves the taking of property by
"violence or intimidation"). When accomplished by threat, robbery-like blackmail and extortion-is a
conditional threat theft offense. While the demand component in all three might be the same-a
demand for money or some material advantage-the threatened act component differs. Robbery
typically differs from extortion by either of two features of the threatened act component.
First, the threatened act in robbery is threatened to be carried out imminently or immediately if the
victim does not comply with the demand. The threatened act in extortion is threatened to be carried out
at some future point in time. See, e.g., Lindgren, supra note 23, at 115 ("The distinction traditionally
drawn between robbery and ... extortion is that a person commits robbery when he threatens to do
immediate bodily harm, whereas he commits ... extortion when he threatens to do bodily harm in the
future."). Second, while the threatened act in robbery is typically death or serious bodily harm, the
threatened act in extortion is typically a less serious bodily injury or any unlawful act or some specified
lawful acts. See, e.g., PAUL ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW 788 (1997) ("Where the actor causes or threatens
immediate serious bodily injury, the offense is robbery .... Where the actor threatens less than serious
bodily injury ... the offense is theft by extortion."). Less typically, the threatened act may be any
serious felony, any felony, or any unlawful act. See, e.g., LAFAVE, supra, at 872-75. For examples of
robbery statutes requiring this type of threatened act, see infra Part II.A. 1. In contrast, the threatened act
in (nonextortion) blackmail is a lawful act. For other differences between robbery and extortion, see
LAFAVE, supra, at 882-83; ROBINSON, supra, at 781.
29. Criminalizing conditional threats to commit unlawful acts is unproblematic:
[The robber] is not threatening to do something that he or she has a fight to do. No one has a
right to inflict unprovoked violence on another, and laws against such violence, an obvious
harm, are among the least mysterious. Furthermore, it is relatively unproblematic to outlaw
the making of a threat to do something that is illegal.
Smith, supra note 20, at 864.
30. See, e.g., FEINBERG, supra note I, at 239 ("The robber and other extortionists, in short, threaten to
do what they have no legal right to do, and then demand money for not doing it, while the blackmailer
threatens only to do what he has a legal ight to do, and then offers to refrain from doing so for a fee.").
31. For a discussion of the justification of the criminalization of robbery, see infra notes 260-65 and
accompanying text.
32. See, e.g., Berman, supra note 10, at 797 ("Despite many efforts, however, it is an understatement
to observe that no consensus has emerged in support of any one or combination of the proffered
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This Article introduces a novel way of expressing the canonical blackmail
proposal that both bridges and widens the justificatory gap between blackmail
and robbery. This new expression I will term "meta-blackmail. '33 In contrast to
the conventional expression of the canonical blackmail proposal, a meta-
blackmail expression threatens blackmail itself. For example, Blackmailer says
to Victim, "If you do not give me $1000, then I will blackmail you." While the
threatened act in the conventional expression-disclosure of the adultery-is
lawful, the threatened act in the meta-blackmail expression-blackmail it-
self-is criminal. Thus, while conventional blackmail's criminalization is puz-
zling to justify, meta-blackmail's criminalization is seemingly easily justified.
Meta-blackmail may be justified as criminal on the same basis as robbery-a
demand for money coupled with the threat to commit an unlawful act.
No existing theory of blackmail has addressed meta-blackmail.34 This Article
undertakes an analysis of the three logically possible outcomes as to the
comparative assessment of meta-blackmail versus conventional blackmail: (i)
meta-blackmail constitutes a more serious level of criminality than conventional
blackmail, (ii) meta-blackmail is equivalent to conventional blackmail, and (iii)
meta-blackmail is less serious than conventional blackmail.35 Each of these
possible outcomes is supported by an interpretive strategy or perspective-
formalist, 36 functionalist, 37 and substantivist, 38 respectively39-which, in turn,
theories [of blackmail]."); lsenbergh, supra note 1, at 1907 ("Scholarly accounts of the prohibition of
blackmail are widely contradictory; none seems to me entirely satisfying."); Smith, supra note 20, at
862 ("Despite great efforts on the part of commentators, thus far no theory of blackmail's status as a
crime has gained wide acceptance.").
33. I am indebted to Leo Katz for coining the term.
34. For a review of the principal accounts of blackmail, none of which address meta-blackmail, see
infra Part I.
35. For a discussion of a possible fourth outcome, see infra note 213.
36. The formalist approach focuses on the formal difference between meta-blackmail and conven-
tional blackmail. While meta-blackmail threatens an unlawful act (blackmail itself), the conventional
blackmail proposal threatens a lawful act (disclosure of another's embarrassing secret). As a result,
meta-blackmail arguably should be treated as the more serious level of criminality. For a more
expansive discussion of the formalist approach, see infra Part II.A. For a discussion of the various types
of formalism in law and morality, see Richard H. Pildes, Forms of Formalism, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 607,
607 (1999) (identifying three types of formalism); Martin Stone, Formalism, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 166, 170-71 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002)
(categorizing seven varieties of formalism).
37. The functionalist approach focuses on the function each proposal serves. The meta-blackmail
proposal arguably serves the same function as the conventional blackmail proposal, because it ulti-
mately puts the recipient to the same choice as does conventional blackmail-whether concealment of
the secret is valued more than the amount of the demanded payment. Since the two proposals are
functionally equivalent, they should be treated as equivalent levels of criminality. For a more expansive
discussion of the functionalist approach, see infra Part III.A. For a discussion of functionalism, and its
opposition to formalism, see KArz, supra note 1, at 2-4; Pildes, supra note 36, at 609-10.
38. The substantivist approach focuses on the substantive difference between meta-blackmail and
conventional blackmail. One such difference is that by uttering a meta-blackmail proposal one threatens
blackmail and by uttering a conventional blackmail proposal one actually commits blackmail. Since
arguably a threat to commit a crime should be a lesser level of criminality than actually committing that
crime, meta-blackmail should be treated as a lesser level of criminality than conventional blackmail.
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is supported by a compelling principle or intuition. ° Supporting the formalist
approach that meta-blackmail is more serious is the intuition that a conditional
threat to commit an unlawful act is properly more serious, ceteris paribus, 4I
than a conditional threat to commit a lawful act. Equally intuitive, in support of
the functionalist approach, is that if two differently expressed proposals both, in
effect, propose exchanging the concealment of the same secret in return for the
same amount of money to the same person, the two proposals should be treated
equivalently under the criminal law. And supporting the substantivist approach
that meta-blackmail is a less serious level of criminality is the intuition that a
conditional threat to threaten is less serious, ceteris paribus, than a conditional
threat.42
None of these three approaches is clearly preferable to the others. Considered
individually all three intuitions are compelling. But as applied to the compara-
tive assessment of meta-blackmail and conventional blackmail, they are jointly
incompatible. This gives rise to what we might term the trilemma of meta-
blackmail.
Examination of this trilemma tests our commitment to the intuition that
blackmail is properly criminalized. As will be demonstrated, decriminalizing
blackmail dissolves the trilemma and affords the embrace of all three compel-
ling intuitions without conflict. Criminalizing blackmail is consistent with any
one, but only one, of the three compelling intuitions. If we are to preserve our
intuition that blackmail is properly criminalized, we must reject two of the three
compelling intuitions. Like a blackmail proposal, the trilemma puts to us a
difficult choice of which we value more. Resolving the trilemma of meta-
blackmail either forces the decriminalization of blackmail or adds considerably
to the already difficult puzzles to be surmounted in justifying the criminalization
For a more expansive discussion of the substantivist approach, see infra Part V.A. For an additional
substantive difference between the two proposals, see infra note 42 and accompanying text. For a
discussion of substantivism and its opposition to formalism, see P.S. ATIYAH & ROBERT S. SUMMERS,
FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW 5-11 (1987); Daniel Farber, Legal Formalism and the
Red-Hot Knife, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 597, 600 (1999).
39. The labels "formalist," "functionalist," and "substantivist" are merely suggestive. No aspect of
this Article's argument hinges on whether treating meta-blackmail as more serious, equivalent, or less
serious does or does not truly exemplify formalism, functionalism, and substantivism, respectively.
40. Cf. Avery Katz, The Economics of Form and Substance in Contract Interpretation, 104 COLUM.
L. REV. 496, 496 (2004) ("[A]lmost all questions of interpretation implicate the tension between form
and substance.").
41. For a discussion of the philosophical uses of the phrase "ceteris paribus," or "all other things
being equal," see JULIAN BAGGINI & PETER S. FoSL, THE PHILOSOPHER'S TOOLKIT: A COMPENDIUM OF
PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS AND METHODS 74-76 (2003).
42. Because blackmail is a conditional threat, meta-blackmail (which threatens blackmail itself) is a
conditional threat to threaten. The intuitions supporting the substantivist approach that meta-blackmail
is less serious are that (i) threatening blackmail is less serious than actually committing blackmail, and
(ii) a conditional threat to threaten is less serious than a conditional threat. For a discussion of these
intuitions, see infra Part IV.A.
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of blackmail.43
After canvassing and critiquing the principal existing theories of blackmail in
Part I of this Article, Part II presents the formalist perspective or interpretive
strategy, focusing on the lawful act threatened in conventional blackmail and
the unlawful act threatened in meta-blackmail. A plausible, if not compelling,
intuition or principle is that proposals threatening unlawful acts should be
considered more serious, ceteris paribus, than proposals threatening lawful acts.
Applying the principle or intuition to the formal difference between the propos-
als generates the conclusion that meta-blackmail should reach a more serious
level of criminality than conventional blackmail. Supporting this conclusion is
that meta-blackmail (but not conventional blackmail) qualifies as the greater
crime of robbery and is clearly coercive. But the formalist approach generates
significant puzzles and difficulties. For example, how can threatening to commit
a crime be more serious than actually committing the crime? That is, how can
threatening blackmail be more serious than blackmail itself?
44
Part III advances the functionalist perspective or interpretive strategy that
views meta-blackmail and conventional blackmail as equivalent in function in
that each puts Victim to the same ultimate choice-either pay $1000 to conceal
the secret or do not pay and risk disclosure of the secret. Unpacking the
meta-blackmail proposal reveals it to be composed of the same individually
lawful components as blackmail. Because the threatened act is blackmail itself,
and blackmail itself (in the context of the hypothetical) contains a threat to
disclose the secret, the meta-blackmail proposal may be understood as a threat
to threaten to disclose the secret. In effect and function, a threat to threaten to
disclose the secret boils down to a threat to disclose the secret which is no
different than conventional blackmail. As a result, the functionalist perspective
views them not as two proposals but as two irrelevantly different expressions of
the same proposal.45 Based on the intuition that functionally equivalent propos-
als should be treated equivalently, meta-blackmail and conventional blackmail
43. The recent trend in blackmail scholarship has been to downgrade the degree of difficulty of
satisfactorily justifying blackmail's criminalization from a paradox, see, e.g., Lindgren, supra note 1, at
670, to merely a puzzle, see, e.g., Berman, supra note 10, at 796 n.1; Clark, supra note 25, at 55;
Fletcher, supra note 13, at 1617; Gordon, supra note 25, at 1742-46; Grant Lamond, Coercion, Threats
and the Puzzle of Blackmail, in HARM AND CULPABILITY 215, 216 n.1 (A.P. Simester & A.T.H. Smith
eds., 1996). But see Sidney DeLong, Blackmailers, Bribe Takers, and the Second Paradox, 141 U. PA.
L. REV. 1663, 1663-65 (1993) (identifying two paradoxes of blackmail); Gorr, supra note 16, at 44-49
(contending that blackmail is paradoxical but susceptible to resolution under most circumstances); Saul
Smilansky, May We Stop Worrying About Blackmail? 55 ANALYSIS 116, 116 (1995) (acknowledging that
blackmail is paradoxical). Whether termed a paradox or a puzzle, blackmail is no less mysterious. This
Article will demonstrate that this current trend is misguided and that justifying the criminalization of
blackmail is appreciably more difficult than even previously supposed.
44. The formalist approach incurs additional difficulties from the perspective of the other two
approaches to meta-blackmail. For example, if meta-blackmail and conventional blackmail are function-
ally equivalent, then why should meta-blackmail be treated as more serious?
45. For example, the expressions "4+3" and "5+2" are nominally and formally different, but
functionally equivalent in expressing the amount represented by the numeral "7."
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should be treated as equivalent in seriousness of criminality. But the functional-
ist approach also generates significant puzzles and anomalies. For example, how
can a threat to commit a lawful act be as serious, ceteris paribus, as a threat to
commit an unlawful act?
Part IV considers the substantivist perspective or interpretive strategy that
meta-blackmail is less serious than conventional blackmail. Where the function-
alist views a threat to threaten to disclose a secret as effectively collapsing into
a threat to disclose a secret, the substantivist perspective finds a substantive
difference between a threat to threaten and a threat. The harm in a threat to
threaten is arguably more remote, indirect, and attenuated than a threat. A
plausible, if not compelling, intuition is that, ceteris paribus, the more remote,
indirect, and attenuated the threatened harm of a proposal, the less serious the
level of criminality. Applying the intuition to the substantivist interpretive
strategy generates the conclusion that meta-blackmail (a conditional threat to
threaten) is less serious than conventional blackmail (a conditional threat). Like
the other two approaches, however, the substantivist approach yields significant
puzzles. For example, how can threatening an unlawful act be a less serious
crime, ceteris paribus, than threatening a lawful act?
Part V considers the preferability of the three approaches to meta-blackmail
from a variety of perspectives. First, with respect to harmonizing blackmail with
robbery, treating meta-blackmail as equivalent or less serious would necessitate
revision of some jurisdictions' robbery statutes. Second, with respect to resolv-
ing the puzzle of blackmail, the most promising approach is treating meta-
blackmail and conventional blackmail equivalently. If equivalent, and because
meta-blackmail threatens an unlawful act, then conventional blackmail is equiva-
lent to a proposal threatening an unlawful act. Because justifying the criminaliza-
tion of threats to commit unlawful acts is unproblematic, and conventional
blackmail is functionally equivalent 46 to a threat to commit an unlawful act,
justifying the criminalization of conventional blackmail is seemingly also unprob-
lematic. While from a formalist perspective conventional blackmail threatens a
lawful act, from a functionalist perspective it threatens an unlawful act.47
Analysis of meta-blackmail might then be seen as the holy grail of blackmail
scholarship-the identification of an independently unlawful component of
blackmail. While this may provide a technical solution to the puzzle of black-
mail, as will be demonstrated, it is not an altogether satisfactory solution.48
Third, with respect to supporting the decriminalization of blackmail, none of the
approaches is preferable. But this very indeterminacy as to the preferable
46. For a discussion of functionally equivalent blackmail transactions, see KATZ, supra note 1, at
2-4.
47. From the functionalist perspective, conventional blackmail may be understood to threaten an
unlawful act, because meta-blackmail clearly threatens an unlawful act, and meta-blackmail and
conventional blackmail are arguably functionally equivalent.
48. For a discussion of why the technical solution to the puzzle of blackmail supplied by the analysis
of meta-blackmail is not entirely satisfactory, see infra Part V.B.
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approach supports decriminalizing blackmail by generating the trilemma of
meta-blackmail which is best resolved by decriminalizing blackmail.
I. A CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE THEORIES OF BLACKMAIL
It is widely acknowledged that no resolution of the blackmail puzzle has yet
been found acceptable.49 Commentators express skepticism that any single
argument or approach can satisfactorily explain blackmail,50 suggest that some
combination or patchwork theory may be necessary,5I and even caution that a
combination of theories is unworkable.52 One commentator goes so far as to
conclude "that the paradoxes of blackmail may not yield to rational analysis.,
53
Proponents of the competing approaches to the justification of blackmail-
consequentialist and nonconsequentialist 54-have each asserted that the other
approach is inadequate to the task.55 Russell Hardin despairs of the possibility
that either approach will be found satisfactory to an adherent of the other
approach.56 Recently, Mitchell Berman has argued that the two predominant
approaches to resolving the paradox (in addition to the specific answers thus far
49. See supra notes 6-7, 20 & 32 and accompanying text.
50. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 13, at 1637 ("Many words and expressions at hand express what is
wrong with blackmail .... None of these arguments, however, offers a convincing account of the
difference between cases of punishable and nonpunishable conduct. All of them capture a portion of
blackmail's evil, but none accounts systematically for [all of] the cases.").
51. See, e.g., Scott Altman, A Patchwork Theory of Blackmail, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1639, 1640 (1993)
("I recommend abandoning the search for a unified explanation. Probably no single flaw justifies
condemning and prohibiting all and only blackmail transactions."); Mark P. Gergen, A Priest Responds
to the Bean Counters: Leo Katz on Evasion, Blackmail, Fraud, and Kindred Puzzles of the Law, 22
LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 879, 891-92 (1997) (book review) (arguing same); Gordon, supra note 25, at 1785
(same).
52. Smith, supra note 20, at 897 ("[A multitude-of-approaches solution risks] becoming a just-so
story: a post-hoc rationalization that blackmail is illegal because it has that unique combination of
negative features which we wish to criminalize. A theory like that is not very predictive and explains
little.").
53. DeLong, supra note 43, at 1665.
54. Consequentialist accounts attempt to justify blackmail's prohibition based on the bad societal
consequences that stem from blackmail. See infra Part I.A. Nonconsequentialist accounts attempt to
identify why blackmail is intrinsically wrong. See infra Part I.B. For the view that accounts of
blackmail may be divided between consequentialist and nonconsequentialist theories, see, for example,
Berman, supra note 10, at 799; Lindgren, supra note 2, at 1976, 1981. Alan Wertheimer similarly
divides up blackmail theories between internal (nonconsequentialist) and external (consequentialist)
theories. ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION 93, 96 (1987). A symposium on blackmail distinguished the
approaches by the terms "Economics" (consequentialist) and "Morals" (nonconsequentialist). See
generally Symposium, Blackmail, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1565 (1993).
55. See Smith, supra note 20, at 863 ("[Blackmail] is such a central puzzle to legal theorists that it
has led to claims by those in the utilitarian and deontological camps that the other framework for
explaining the criminal law must be inadequate.").
56. Hardin, supra note 23, at 1816 ("There is little hope that any theory is soon going to trump all
the others. Any moral argument that concludes that blackmail is right or wrong tout court is specious.
Blackmail, like every other kind of action or result, is right or wrong, good or bad only as an
implication of particular moral theories.").
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proposed) are doomed to failure.57 In addition to failing to resolve the puzzle of
conventional blackmail, none of the following theories satisfactorily explain, or
even address, meta-blackmail.
A. CONSEQUENTIALIST
Consequentialist approaches to blackmail attempt to justify its criminaliza-
tion by the undesirable consequences which would stem from permitting black-
mail. Economists and "law and economics" scholars have been drawn less to
the "why is it unlawful to threaten to do that which is lawful" puzzle of
blackmail than to the related puzzle of how to distinguish blackmail from
permissible "hard bargains. 58 For an example, consider Jeffrie Murphy's clas-
sic hypothetical of a permissible hard bargain (hereinafter the "Baseball Ex-
ample").59 Suppose a sports memorabilia dealer knows that your son is dying
and that the only thing which would bring your son solace in his last days is a
baseball autographed by Babe Ruth which is the last of its kind in existence.
Although the "going rate" for the ball is $6000, the dealer knows that you have
$12,000 (which is all the money you have in the world). The dealer makes the
following proposal: "If you do not pay me $12,000, I will not give you the
baseball." Though perhaps unfair, the dealer's proposition is lawful. For another
example of a transaction thought to have the same structure as blackmail but
which is generally permissible, consider the economic boycott of a store or
company in order to change their employment practices or political stances. 60 If
57. Berman, supra note 10, at 797 ("[Both approaches will] always prove unable to distinguish
blackmail from much behavior that is, and should remain, free from criminal sanction.").
58. Ginsburg and Shechtman comment negatively on efforts to distinguish blackmail from other
permissible transactions:
The legal literature especially suffers from an inability to define blackmail in a way that
meaningfully distinguishes it from threats of unquestioned legality made in the course of
economic bargaining. All agree that a key employee may lawfully threaten to quit unless his
wages are raised, and that if his threat comes at a time when his employer is particularly
vulnerable, he may have engaged in sharp practices but not criminal conduct. Many threats,
such as those of a customer to take his business elsewhere if a price is not lowered, or to enter
production for his own use if suppliers are not more obliging, are actually relied upon in a
competitive exchange economy to discipline the market. But despite our general ability to
agree on the lawfulness of particular threats, drafting a general law that separates blackmail
from bargaining has proved an elusive task.
Ginsburg & Shechtman, supra note 1, at 1849.
59. Murphy, supra note 6, at 156-57.
60. Consider the following analogy between economic boycotts and blackmail:
When X boycotts Y he offers Y his future patronage solely on condition of Y's changing his
ways in some manner pleasing to X where this change is external to the normal conception of
what Y sells. Thus, X boycotts Y if he indicates that he will not patronize retailer Y unless Y
ends racial discrimination in his hiring [practices] .... Y will see the financial and psychic
costs of securing relief from the boycott as purchasing something which he would have gotten
anyway in the normal course of events.
Such a special boycott, then, is like the blackmailing of a private person since no motive is
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such hard bargains are lawful, how do we distinguish them, if at all, from
impermissible transactions like blackmail?
Distinguishing blackmail from permissible transactions has significant impli-
cations for economic theory6' and political philosophy. 62 Libertarians contend
that all economic exchanges between consenting adults, including blackmail,
are permissible.63 On the other hand, Marxists claim that all capitalistic ex-
changes, because they are akin to blackmail, should be impermissible. 64 Upon
blackmail, then, oddly enough, both Marxists and Libertarians, though drawing
different conclusions as to its permissibility, agree: it is not distinguishable from
other capitalistic transactions. It is Liberals who argue that blackmail is properly
prohibited and seek to distinguish it from hard, but permissible, bargains like
the Baseball Example.
There are two principal consequentialist approaches to blackmail. First,
blackmail promotes economic inefficiency because it is an "unproductive ex-
change,65 and a waste of resources by both the blackmailer and the black-
mailee.6 6 Second, blackmail generates harms extrinsic to the blackmail exchange
by encouraging fraud6 7 and unlawful blackmailee self-help.68
1. Blackmail as Economic Inefficiency
a. Unproductive Exchange. Judge Richard Posner, Robert Nozick, Judge Doug-
las Ginsburg and Paul Shechtman, and Ronald Coase each argue that black-
mail's economic inefficiency supplies a basis for both criminalizing it as well as
distinguishing it from permissible bargains. In typical bargains, the seller
exchanges a good in return for the purchaser's money or other consideration.
Because each values what the other is exchanging more than what each gives
up, the transaction yields a net benefit. In contrast, blackmail transactions are
involved in the posing of the boycott threat except that of securing the special 'payment' from
the retailer.... If such a boycott succeeds, the retailer gets only the patronage that he
otherwise would have gotten and he pays a higher price-the surrender of the normal goods
plus his preferred racial or political stance.
Mack, supra note 21, at 282. Mack concludes that because such boycotts are permissible-and because
blackmail cannot be distinguished, on a principled basis, from such boycotts-blackmail should also be
permissible. Id. at 282-83.
61. Posner, supra note 1, at 1818 ("Economists and economically minded lawyers have found the
prohibition of blackmail more problematic than have other students of the legal system. Economists
tend to be great believers in voluntary transactions.").
62. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 6, at 157-58.
63. Id. at 157 n.ll (quoting ROTHBARD, supra note 21, at 443 n.49 ("Blackmail would not be illegal
in the free society. For blackmail is the receipt of money in exchange for the service of not publicizing
certain information about the other person. No violence or threat of violence to person or property is
involved.")).
64. Id. at 157.
65. See infra Part L.A.l.a.
66. See infra Parts I.A.l.b-c.
67. See infra Part I.A.2.a.
68. See infra Part I.A.2.b.
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merely a "sterile redistributive activity,, 69 or "unproductive exchange," 70 in
which there is no net social welfare gain.71 But by criminalizing blackmail,
"factors of production are released for other purposes and the value of produc-
tion is increased."
72
Under Nozick's account, there are two necessary conditions for an unproduc-
tive exchange: (i) the purchaser is not made better off than she would be
without the transaction,73 and (ii) "it merely gives you [the purchaser] relief
from something that would not threaten if not for the possibility of an exchange
to get relief from it."' 7 4 This second condition is best explained by an example:
If your next-door neighbor plans to erect a certain structure on his land, which
he has a right to do, you might be better off if he didn't exist at all. (No one
else would choose to erect that monstrosity [that ruins your scenic view].) Yet
purchasing his abstention from proceeding with his plans will be a productive
exchange. Suppose, however, that the neighbor has no desire to erect the
structure on the land; he formulates his plan and informs you of it solely in
order to sell you his abstention from it. Such an exchange would not be a
75productive one....
In other words, Nozick's second condition is that the seller's sole motive is to
sell abstention. Since a blackmailee would be better off without the blackmailer,
and the blackmailer's motive is to sell abstention, blackmail is an unproductive
exchange,76 and thus should be unlawful.
Joseph Isenbergh explains, however, that blackmail only appears to be sterile
and unproductive, because nothing seems to change.77 But what changes are
your property rights.78 Although in Nozick's example your view is no better
now than it was before the purchase of the scenic easement, you now have a
property right to enjoy the view which you previously enjoyed only by happen-
stance.79 Similarly, "something does happen in a blackmail bargain: a reframing
69. Posner, supra note 1, at 1820.
70. NOZICK, supra note 16, at 84-86.
71. See Ginsburg & Shechtman, supra note 1, at 1859.
72. Coase, supra note 3, at 673.
73. NoZICK, supra note 16, at 84 ("[1]f I pay you for not harming me, I gain nothing from you that I
wouldn't possess if either you didn't exist at all or existed without having anything to do with me.").
74. Id. at 85.
75. Id. at 84-85.
76. Id. at 85.
77. Isenbergh, supra note 1, at 1920-21.
78. Id. at 1921. Henry Smith makes the similar point that property rights are altered in informational
blackmail: "The blackmailer has not invested in receiving a mere transfer payment for maintaining the
status quo: the now-suppressed evidence might have come out some other way but now cannot." Smith,
supra note 20, at 892.
79. Contrary to Nozick, Isenbergh persuasively argues that the "exchange is in fact productive given
the more valuable allocation of property rights that results." Isenbergh, supra note 1, at 1920-21. The
allocation of property rights that results is more valuable, because you value the view more than your
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of property rights between" the blackmailer and the purchaser of concealment.8 °
The purchaser "has more secure control over the information than before as a
result of the bargain.",81 Accordingly, blackmail exchanges are productive rather
than wasteful. 82 And by prohibiting productive exchanges, it is the criminaliza-
tion of blackmail, not blackmail itself, which is inefficient.
8 3
Consider the following more specific example demonstrating that Nozick's
account is underinclusive in that not all instances of blackmail would satisfy the
first condition of an unproductive exchange.84 Suppose a private detective hired
by your soon-to-be-divorced spouse unearths information on you that would
cost you millions of dollars in your divorce settlement were it to come to
light.85 If the private detective offers not to disclose the information to your
spouse if you pay $10,000 (double the $5,000 fee the detective would have
received from your spouse), the exchange (despite constituting blackmail) is
productive, because you (as well as the detective) are made better off.86
Nozick's theory is also overinclusive, because permissible transactions also
satisfy the conditions for an unproductive exchange.87 Consider a variation on
the Baseball Example.88 Suppose the father takes the dying son every day to the
free local sports museum, which has in its collection the prized baseball. Due to
budgetary cutbacks the museum is forced to sell the baseball to an exhibitor
neighbor values the right to build; similarly, your neighbor values your money more than the right to
build. Id. at 1921-22.
80. Id. at 1920.
81. Id.
82. The allocation of rights in the blackmail exchange is more valuable, because the blackmailee
values concealment of the information more than the money used to purchase the concealment;
similarly, the blackmailer values receipt of the purchase price more than the right to disclose the
information. Because in the blackmail exchange each party values what they receive more than what
they give up, the exchange is productive.
83. For a critical comment on Isenbergh's approach, see Berman, supra note 10, at 813-14, who
argues that Isenbergh's "radical" explanation of the puzzle of blackmail is not "in tune with current law
and common intuition" and fails to justify blackmail's prohibition. However, Berman fails to level any
specific criticism at lsenbergh's account and ultimately uses Isenbergh's analysis supporting decriminal-
ization of blackmail to critique other economic inefficiency accounts that support blackmail's prohibi-
tion.
84. For the view that Nozick's account is underinclusive, see, for example, Berman, supra note 10,
at 828-29; Katz, supra note 6, at 1579; and Murphy, supra note 6, at 158-59.
85. To tighten the hypothetical we might further suppose that the detective has obtained the only
evidence of your damaging conduct and that but for the detective's obtaining this evidence first, your
spouse would have eventually obtained it through other means.
86. For a different criticism of Nozick's first condition for an unproductive exchange, see Fletcher,
supra note 13, at 1623, who argues that whether a transaction makes one better or worse off than if the
transaction did not exist at all is inescapably ambiguous, because it depends on what one's baseline or
normal state of affairs is apart from the transaction.
87. Katz, supra note 6, at 1579 ("It sweeps into the blackmail category a lot of perfectly innocent
conduct: The silver medalist at the Olympics would be better off if the gold medalist didn't exist.")
Though satisfying the first condition for an unproductive exchange, the example is unclear as to how
the second condition would be satisfied.
88. This variation is based, in part, on a hypothetical devised by David Owens. See Owens, supra
note 6, at 501-05.
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who buys it only to make money by charging people exorbitant sums to see it.
The exhibitor threatens not to let the dying son view the baseball unless his fee
is met. If the father pays, is the exchange unproductive? The first condition is
satisfied because the father would have been better off had the exhibitor not
existed and the baseball stayed in the museum. The second condition is also
satisfied because the exhibitor's only motive in obtaining the baseball is to sell
abstention (from a threat that would not be made were it not for the possibility
of entering into an exchange to sell relief from it). Though the exhibitor's
activity is entirely lawful it would nonetheless constitute an unproductive
exchange and would be unlawful under Nozick's account.
89
b. Blackmailer's Waste of Resources. Coase, as well as Ginsburg and Shecht-
man, argue that blackmail's waste of resources supports its prohibition. The
blackmailer incurs research costs in obtaining the information and both black-
mailer and blackmailee incur transaction costs. 90 "No rational economic planner
would tolerate the existence of an industry dedicated to digging up dirt, at real
resource cost, and then reburying it."9'
But the waste of resources approach is underinclusive in accounting for two
types of blackmail in which the information is fortuitously obtained without
incurring research costs. In the first type, termed "participant blackmail, 92 the
blackmailer acquires the information through a prior relationship with the
victim. 93 The second type, "opportunistic blackmail, '94 arises where the black-
mailer accidentally stumbles across the information.95 Therefore, discouraging
the waste of resources in the acquisition of the information cannot explain the
prohibition of these two types of blackmail.
96
Ginsburg and Shechtman reply that if the blackmailer discloses the informa-
tion (in order to bolster the credibility of her future threats), the transaction
costs she incurs in doing so are not a result of the accidentally acquired
information but constitute "an investment decision, 97 for the next blackmail
89. Perhaps the most fundamental difficulty with Nozick's approach is its failure to demonstrate that
such "unproductive exchanges" are immoral. Moreover, even if they are immoral it is not clear that
they should be criminalized rather than constrained through tort or contract remedies. See Berman,
supra note 10, at 829; Gordon, supra note 25, at 1758 & n.83; Lindgren, supra note 1, at 700; Murphy,
supra note 6, at 158; Smith, supra note 20, at 890 n.91.
90. See Coase, supra note 3, at 674 (contending that the resources utilized to collect information for
blackmail are wasted).
91. Ginsburg & Shechtman, supra note 1, at 1860 (footnote omitted).
92. HEPWORTH, supra note 5, at 76-77.
93. For an example of participant blackmail, suppose a man has an affair with a woman he believed
to be unmarried and, upon subsequently finding out her marital status, decides to blackmail her years
later by threatening to reveal the affair to her husband.
94. HEPWORTH, supra note 5, at 75-76.
95. For an example of opportunistic blackmail, suppose a motorist pulls into a seemingly deserted
highway rest stop and sees a famous televangelist having sexual intercourse with a woman not his wife
and subsequently blackmails him.
96. Lindgren, supra note 1, at 694-95.
97. Ginsburg & Shechtman, supra note 1, at 1876.
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opportunity.98 But then Ginsburg and Shechtman cannot account for blackmail's
prohibition where the blackmailer fails to disclose. Additionally, they cannot
explain blackmail's prohibition where the blackmailer discloses out of sadistic
pleasure in seeing the blackmailee suffer, for the pleasure of spreading gossip,
out of civic duty or to benefit another,99 for selfish economic gain unrelated to
another blackmailing opportunity,' 00 or to bolster not their credibility as a
blackmailer but their bargaining credibility in the "legitimate" business world.,",
Coase argues that the transaction costs of the blackmail bargain itself are
wasted.10 2 But the costs incurred by at least some blackmailers in making good
on their threat and disclosing may be so slight-picking up a phone or mailing a
letter-as to be trivial. 103 Even if the costs of carrying out a blackmail threat are
nontrivial, what is lacking is a demonstration that participant and opportunistic
blackmail involve appreciably greater transaction costs than permissible eco-
nomic transactions.' 04
c. Blackmailee's Waste of Resources. Rather than focusing on the blackmail-
er's wasted resources, another approach considers the blackmailee's waste of
98. Id. at 1875-76.
99. While not completely altruistic, a blackmailer whose threat is rebuffed might disclose informa-
tion about the character of a politician that he feels, if he cannot make money from its concealment,
should be disclosed for the public good. Or another blackmailer might disclose, if he cannot profit from
its concealment, an adulterous affair, because he believes it is wrong and that the betrayed spouse
deserves to know.
100. While she would prefer to profit by concealing the information, a blackmailer might disclose
embarrassing facts about a business competitor that will cause his business to lose customers. The
blackmailer discloses not so much to personally harm the competitor but so as to benefit her own
business by gaining the competitor's customers.
101. Posner observes that, "[t]hreats have the interesting property that both parties involved-the
threatener and the person threatened-are made worse off if the threat is actually carried out." Posner,
supra note 1, at 1819. While this is true in the short run, some advantages accrue to the threatener who
demonstrates a willingness to carry out a threat despite it not being in his immediate interest. As
Berman explains, these advantages accrue both to blackmailers and "legitimate" businessmen:
A reputation as someone willing to forego a benefit or incur costs if not obliged is extraordinar-
ily valuable in the "legitimate" business world. It allows one to secure a disproportionately
large share of the potential benefits of exchange. And, when it comes to exploiting that
reputation, it should make no difference whether it was forged as an adventitious blackmailer,
or as a used car salesman, or as a distributor of fava beans.
Berman, supra note 10, at 805.
102. Coase, supra note 3, at 674 (maintaining that wasted "resources would certainly be employed
in the blackmailing transaction"). Lindgren disagrees: "[W]here no expenses have been spent seeking
damaging information, the blackmail bargain proceeds much as any other. The blackmailer and her
victim will enter into the deal only if each expects a net gain-and a gain large enough to offset the
transaction costs of bargaining." James Lindgren, Blackmail: On Waste, Morals, and Ronald Coase, 36
UCLA L. REV. 597, 602 (1989).
103. Shavell, supra note 1, at 1889 ("The direct cost to a blackmailer of actually carrying out his
threat is ordinarily trivial; it takes almost no effort to mail a photograph or a document to someone.").
104. Berman, supra note 10, at 803-04 ("The transaction costs, whatever they may be, are
facilitative, not deadweight-and mirror transaction costs present in ordinary bargaining situations.");
Lindgren, supra note 1, at 696-97 (noting that blackmail may entail less, not more, transaction costs
than other lawful alternatives, such as a civil suit).
META-BLACKMAIL
resources.0 5 In contrast to Ginsburg and Shechtman, Steven Shavell concedes
that the illegality of participant and opportunistic blackmail "cannot be ex-
plained by a need to discourage wasteful efforts to obtain information."' 6 Even
so, "there is still an obvious incentive-based reason for making [those types of]
blackmail illegal: to avoid being blackmailed ... potential victims will exercise
excessive precautions or reduce their level of innocent, yet embarrassing,
activities."'' 0 7 For example, out of fear of being blackmailed by the disclosure of
embarrassing pictures, people might diminish the frequency of their showers or
morally permissible sexual intercourse.'08 Thus, blackmail of innocent activity
may produce a waste of resources sufficient both to constitute a net harm and to
justify blackmail's prohibition. 09
The wasted resources of victims taking excessive precautions against being
blackmailed, however, cannot satisfactorily explain the prohibition of opportunis-
tic and participant blackmail where the threat is to disclose lawful but socially
harmful conduct." 0 For an example of this type of blackmail, consider a
blackmail threat to reveal the wasteful but lawful expenditure of church funds
by a minister."' In contrast to blackmail of innocent but embarrassing activity,
the minister's aversion to being blackmailed for irresponsible use of church
funds creates an incentive for his proper use of the funds which Shavell
acknowledges is socially beneficial.' 12
The arguments justifying the prohibition of blackmail on economic grounds
of inefficiency, waste of resources, and unproductivity have been severely
criticized in the literature. First, a common assumption under these theories is
that the information will not be disclosed and thus bargaining about its nondisclo-
sure is wasteful." 3 But the prevalence of gossip and the endless recitation of
people's embarrassing acts in newspapers, television, and other media demon-
strate that this empirical assumption is unfounded." 4 Second, arguments of
105. Shavell, supra note 1, at 1894 ("[Plrecautions taken by potential victims avoiding threats
reduce social welfare.").
106. Id. at 1903.
107. Id.
108. See id. at 1897-98 ("[Tlhe efforts to guard against it [blackmail] are social wastes, and the
reduction in the scale of potential victims' activities is a social detriment since the activities are not
harmful yet benefit those who engage in them.").
109. Id. at 1898 (acknowledging that while revelation of information harms the victim it may
enhance the welfare of third parties and thus, "the influence on social welfare ... is ambiguous").
110. If Shavell's account is to succeed it must overcome the objection that there may be benefits to
the precautions taken by potential blackmail victims. See Isenbergh, supra note I, at 193 1; Smith, supra
note 20, at 891.
111. Shavell, supra note 1, at 1898-99.
112. Id.
113. For an example of this mistaken assumption, see id. at 1902 ("[P]eople usually have little
reason to gather embarrassing information or to reveal it if they are not profiting from blackmail
threats.").
114. See, e.g., DeLong, supra note 43, at 1673 ("Given the very low costs of disclosure to most
blackmailers, the social rewards of disclosure, and the blackmailer's typical disregard for the victim's
feelings, it seems likely that many if not most people who would threaten blackmail would happily
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inefficiency may be plausible but they are no more plausible than arguments
that blackmail is productive. 1 5 Third, the economic arguments cannot satisfacto-
rily distinguish permissible transactions from blackmail.' 16 Fourth, efficiency
arguments are overinclusive. If inefficiency is a sufficient condition for criminal-
ization, then many other inefficient, but presently permissible, activities should
also be criminalized.' " 7 Fifth, even if the economic-based theories satisfactorily
explain some types of blackmail, they cannot account for participant and
opportunistic blackmail. 1 8 Sixth, even if blackmail is unambiguously ineffi-
cient and wasteful, that alone is not sufficient justification for the criminaliza-
tion of blackmail rather than some other less restrictive mode of regulation,
such as civil penalties.11 9 And seventh, under at least one economic analysis, it
is not blackmail itself that is inefficient so much as its criminalization. Or,
alternatively, even if blackmail is inefficient, criminalization is counter-
productive in compounding the inefficiency.12 0 Although James Lindgren has
concluded that "the economic theories have considerably closed the gap be-
tween the crime of blackmail and their theoretical explanations,"' 21 they are
still unpersuasive in explaining blackmail's prohibition.
1 2 2
2. Subsidiary Harms of Blackmail
This group of consequentialist theories seeks to justify the prohibition of
blackmail not on grounds of economic inefficiency but rather on the adverse
consequences, extrinsic to the blackmail transaction, caused by blackmail.
a. Blackmail, Inc. Richard Epstein has envisioned a business, "Blackmail,
Inc.," ' 2 3 (which would arise if blackmail was lawful) in which entrepreneurial
blackmailers would troll and advertise for information on which others could be
blackmailed. 124 As a result,
disclose their victim's secret if blackmail were prevented."); Lindgren, supra note 2, at 1976 ("[T]he
empirical claim that the information otherwise wouldn't get out is probably false."); see also supra
notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 77-83; see also DeLong, supra note 43, at 1677; Smith,
supra note 20, at 895-96.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 84-89; see also Smith, supra note 20, at 863.
117. See, e.g., DeLong, supra note 43, at 1668-69; Fletcher, supra note 13, at 1618 & n.2; Smith,
supra note 20, at 892-93.
118. See supra text accompanying notes 92-96, 110-12; see also Berman, supra note 10, at 810,
813; Lindgren, supra note 2, at 1988.
119. See Altman, supra note 51, at 1639; Berman, supra note 10, at 810, 813; Fletcher, supra note
13, at 1618; Murphy, supra note 6, at 162-64; Smith, supra note 20, at 890, 892.
120. Isenbergh, supra note 1, at 1928.
121. Lindgren, supra note 2, at 1988.
122. See id. (concluding that the economic theories have yet to satisfactorily explain blackmail's
prohibition).
123. Epstein, supra note 18, at 562.
124. Id. at 562-66.
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there would then be an open and public market for a new set of social
institutions to exploit the gains from this new form of legal activity. Black-
mail, Inc. could with impunity place advertisements in the newspaper offering
to acquire for top dollar any information with the capacity to degrade or
humiliate persons in the eyes of their families or business associates. Thereaf-
ter, Blackmail, Inc., as a commercial organization, could negotiate contracts
with its sources to suppress the information acquired.
125
Epstein argues that undesirable consequences would arise from the activities of
Blackmail, Inc. in two ways. First, the victim might turn to a life of crime to
support his blackmail "habit."' 26 Second, Blackmail, Inc., to preserve its rev-
enue stream, would facilitate the concealment of the information, thereby
joining the victim in perpetrating a fraud on those having a legitimate interest in
the information (for example, an adulterer's spouse). 127 To avoid the adverse
consequences stemming from the formation of such organizations, Epstein
concludes that blackmail, as "the hand-maiden to corruption and deceit, ' 28 is
properly criminalized. 1
29
b. Blackmailee's Unlawful Self-Help. Henry Smith has recently argued that
Epstein's account is a good start, but does not go far enough. 130 First, according
to Smith, since solicitation (of another to commit fraud) is already a criminal
offense, Epstein's argument would render the prohibition of blackmail superflu-
ous. 1 3' Second, the dangers of blackmailee self-help in the face of blackmail
demands extend well past actions the blackmailee is solicited to commit.132 For
Smith, blackmail is the proximate cause of harmful and/or illegal self-help
measures undertaken by the blackmailee in response to the blackmail pro-
posal. 133 These types of harmful and illegal self-help measures include "killing
the blackmailer, killing a third person, suicide, fraud, and theft" to avoid
disclosure of the information. 134 Smith concludes that blackmail is properly
prohibited because of the deterrent effect on harms resulting from illegal victim
self-help measures.
125. Id. at 562-63.
126. Id. at 564 (arguing that given blackmailees' paramount concern of concealing their embarrass-
ing secrets, thereby precluding them from relying on loans from banks and friends who might inquire as
to the purpose of the loan, blackmailees are particularly pressured to resort to crime to pay off their
blackmail debts).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 566.
129. Id. at 565.
130. Smith, supra note 20, at 888.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 866-73.
134. Id. at 866.
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Epstein's and Smith's accounts are subject to a number of criticisms. 135 First,
they are underinclusive in failing to explain the wrong of blackmail where the
blackmailee is neither induced to commit crimes nor is defrauding a third party.
For example, a fellow employee threatens to reveal your embarrassing but
harmless sexual interests to your employer unless you give his son golf les-
sons. t 3 6 Though you are being blackmailed, you are neither defrauding your
employer as to any information that she has a legitimate interest in nor will you
be forced to turn to a life of crime to provide golf lessons. Second, Epstein's and
Smith's accounts are overinclusive in providing a basis for criminalizing a
significant amount of permissible conduct. Would not simple disclosures or
unconditional threats to disclose information, both of which are permissible,
also impel a shame-avoiding victim to illegal self-help measures? Smith an-
swers that without a demand for money the victim would have no need to steal
to raise the money. 137 But a shame-adverse individual might steal to raise the
money to initiate an offer to the potential discloser not to disclose. Or, alterna-
tively, being precluded from paying for concealment, one might be compelled to
commit even more serious crimes like murder to prevent the disclosure. Third,
many permissible activities may be the proximate cause of victim self-help. The
relentless marketing campaigns targeting inner-city youths with $200 basketball
shoes have been claimed to induce theft to purchase the shoes and even murder
of those wearing the shoes. Should the marketing or selling of such expensive
shoes also be criminalized under Smith's approach? 38 Fourth, and most impor-
tantly, Smith's account fails to distinguish blackmail from permissible economic
transactions.' 
39
135. For a variety of criticisms directed at Epstein's account, see Berman, supra note 10, at 815-17;
Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Blackmail as Private Justice, 141 U. PA. L. Rv. 1935, 1969-72 (1993); Katz,
supra note 6, at 1578; and Lindgren, supra note 1, at 684-87.
136. The example is based on, and combines, an example given by Berman, supra note 10, at
815-16, and an example provided by Katz, supra note 6, at 1578.
137. Smith, supra note 20, at 880. Smith also replies that insufficient time exists prior to the
disclosure for the victim to take any illegal self-help measures. Id. at 879. But what if there was enough
time?
138. See Berman, supra note 10, at 816 n.67 (making a similar criticism of Epstein's theory).
139. Smith claims that his theory satisfactorily distinguishes blackmail from permissible transactions
like the Baseball Example, see supra text accompanying note 59, for several reasons. First, because the
baseball dealer is not using the victim's shame to his advantage and secrecy is not a factor, the victim
can feel free to complain about the transaction and bring societal pressure to bear on the dealer. See
Smith, supra note 20, at 912. But just as shame and secrecy may preclude the blackmail victim from
complaining, fear that the dealer may refuse to sell or continue renting the baseball (which is a unique
product under the terms of the hypothetical) out of spite may also prevent the father from complaining.
Second, unlike with blackmail, in the Baseball Example "the transaction will be above board and so
any illegal consequences will be more likely to be visible to the law." Id. But this begs the question of
whether blackmail should be illegal. If blackmail was legal, then just as in the Baseball Example any
illegal consequences would also be visible to the law. Here, Smith's argument actually supports the
decriminalization of blackmail. Third, in the Baseball Example, the father has a broader and less
harmful range of options; the blackmail victim will "be tempted to take more extreme measures." Id. at




Nonconsequentialist theories of blackmail insist that consequentialist theo-
ries, even apart from their internal defects, fail to account for our intuitions that,
quite apart from any undesirable consequences, blackmail is inherently wrong. 14
0
Even the economist Ronald Coase refers to blackmail as "moral murder" and
"the foulest of crimes."'' As Jeffrie Murphy observes, consequentialist con-
cerns are unnecessary in deciding that "'Give me your money or I will shoot
you' is intolerable whereas 'Give me your money (a fair amount) or I will not
sell you my automobile' is acceptable."'' 42 An "intrinsic difference of principle"
distinguishes them: "the former involves a threat to do something I have no
right to do, whereas the latter does not."'14 3 While nonconsequentialist theories
have sought such an intrinsic difference of principle, Murphy concludes that
"we have found nothing comparable for our blackmail problem."' 44 First,
Murphy rejects coercion as the distinguishing feature of blackmail. 45 Though
taking money through illegitimate threats is paradigmatically coercive, black-
mail being coercive is problematic, because the illegitimacy of the threat is
unclear. 146 Typically, the threatened act in blackmail is lawful. Murphy next
dismisses privacy concerns. 14 7 Since the blackmailer has a right to actually
disclose the embarrassing information, merely threatening to disclose the infor-
mation unless money is paid is no more (and most likely less) a violation of the
victim's privacy than what the blackmailer has a right to do. And finally,
blackmail as constituting a harm is rejected. 48 Even if blackmail constitutes a
harm, it is unclear that blackmail constitutes an impermissible harm-not all
harms are criminally prohibited.
There are two principal nonconsequentialist approaches. First, despite wide-
spread agreement that neither the demand nor threat component alone is illegal
or immoral, efforts have been made to locate the wrong of blackmail in one or
the other of these components. 149 Second, through the combination or synergy
of the components the wrong emerges-the whole is greater than the sum of its
than the father's motive of sustaining his son's life. As a result, the blackmailee may be less likely to
use illegal self-help than the father. What would not each of us do to sustain our son's life?
140. Even some consequentialists find the consequentialist arguments attempting to justify black-
mail's criminalization to be inadequate. See Coase, supra note 3, at 674 (acknowledging that the
argument that blackmail should be prohibited because of its misallocation of resources "does not
explain why there is such general support for making blackmail not merely illegal, but a crime. After
all, in public life we often observe great tolerance of, and indeed encouragement for, policies which
waste resources on a grand scale.").
141. Id. at 674-75.
142. Murphy, supra note 6, at 163.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 156-58.
146. For a more expansive discussion as to whether blackmail is coercive, see infra Part I.B.2.d.
147. Murphy, supra note 6, at 159-60.
148. Id. at 160-62.
149. See infra Part I.B.1.
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parts. 150
1. Wrong of Blackmail in One of Its Components
a. Unlawful Threatened Acts. Under Joel Feinberg's account, the justifiability
of blackmail's prohibition must be a function of the impermissibility of the act
threatened. For threatened acts that could be, or ought to be, the basis for a
crime or tort, blackmail is properly criminalized.15 1 But in the canonical case
where the threatened act is permissible-for example, to reveal sexual indiscre-
tions including adultery152-Feinberg concludes blackmail should be decriminal-
ized.153 According to Feinberg, the coherence of our criminal law can be
maintained by either (i) criminalizing the threatened act of disclosure of the
adultery and continuing to criminalize blackmail, or (ii) continuing to treat such
disclosures as lawful and decriminalizing blackmail.1 54 Feinberg rejects the first
option, because we cannot "on liberal grounds" criminalize such disclosures,
and "they do not wrongfully harm anyone."' 55 The only remaining option
requires decriminalizing that type of blackmail. 1
56
Commentators assessing Feinberg's self-termed "radical conclusion"'' 57 that
the canonical case of blackmail should be decriminalized have termed it "star-
tling"'5s and "a rather astonishing concession.'1 59 In trying to rehabilitate
Feinberg's argument to show that adultery blackmail's prohibition is justified, 1
60
Michael Gorr contends that only "practical and epistemic difficulties" preclude
us from viewing the unconditional threat of disclosure (or offer of concealment)
as morally and legally wrong.' 6' But according to Gorr these same difficulties
do not prevent prohibiting conditional proposals, because they either "offer[] to
conceal what ought morally to be disclosed or ... threaten[] to disclose what
ought morally to be concealed." 
6 2
Gorr's solution is problematic because his central premise that either disclos-
150. See infra Part I.B.2.
151. FEINBERG, supra note 1, at 258 (arguing that blackmail proposals threatening such acts are
properly criminalized because "they threaten to do what is contrary either to the criminal law or to the
civil law, or to what ought to be forbidden by a legal rule of one kind or another").
152. See id. at 246 ("With the possible exception of homosexuality, more people have been
blackmailed for marital infidelity than for any other reason.").
153. Id. at 275.
154. Id. at 246.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 275.
158. Berman, supra note 10, at 821. Berman, however, fails to level any specific criticism against
Feinberg's "startling" conclusion. See id.
159. Gorr, supra note 16, at 50. Gorr further comments that "[p]reviously only libertarians even
more radical than Robert Nozick and Richard Epstein (both of whom generally support prohibiting
blackmail in such cases) have been willing to defend such a view." Id. (footnote omitted).
160. For a critique of Feinberg's approach as both underinclusive and overinclusive, see Katz, supra
note 6, at 1580.




ing or concealing the information is the morally obligatory course of action' 63 is
unpersuasive." 6 In many cases, neither disclosure nor concealment is re-
quired.' 65 Rather, both disclosure and concealment may be permissible but not
obligatory. For example, as a friend to a cuckolded spouse, it is morally
permissible to disclose the other's spouse's infidelity. It is also permissible to
refrain from disclosing the infidelity. But neither course of action is morally
obligatory.
b. Immoral Threatened Acts. In contrast to Feinberg's account that the imper-
missibility of blackmail is a function of the impermissibility of the threatened
act, Leo Katz argues that the wrong of blackmail inheres in the immorality of
the attempt to acquire the victim's money.' 66 According to Katz, "when the
defendant has the victim choose between either of two immoralities which he
must endure, the gravity of the defendant's wrongdoing is to be judged by what
he actually did (or sought to achieve), not by what he threatened to do."'16 7 So
also, the criminal law properly punishes the blackmailer based not on the minor
immorality of what he threatened to do (for example, disclose the informa-
tion), 68 but on the major immorality of what he sought to do (take the victim's
money without the owner's consent). 169 In Katz's view, then, blackmail is a
form of robbery or theft. 7 )
The standard criticism is that Katz merely asserts, without demonstrating, the
immorality of the threatened act. 17 ' Another difficulty is that Katz again seems
to merely assert, without demonstrating, the immorality of the blackmailer
"taking, 172 the blackmailee's money. That the blackmailer commits a theft is
163. Id.
164. Even if there was such a duty to disclose or not disclose, the wrong of violating the duty may
not entirely explain what is considered the wrong of blackmail. As Scott Altman notes, the duty to
disclose or conceal is often owed not to the blackmail victim but to a third party or perhaps the general
public. But it is widely thought that the central wrong of blackmail is to the victim and not a third party.
See Altman, supra note 51, at 1652; see also infra Part I.B.2.c.
165. Altman, supra note 51, at 1652 (noting that "revelation is sometimes permissible and nonmanda-
tory" and Gorr's approach requires a "controversial commitment to the pervasiveness of obligations");
Berman, supra note 10, at 822 (terming Gorr's assumption that either disclosure or concealment of the
information is morally obligatory as "dubious").
166. Katz, supra note 6, at 1598, 1615.
167. Id. at 1598.
168. Id. at 1582-98.
169. Id. at 1599.
170. Id.
171. See, e.g., Gergen, supra note 51, at 890 ("[T]he boundary of blackmail turns on a moral
judgment or intuition that Katz does not try to justify within his theory of blackmail."); Lindgren, supra
note 2, at 1977 ("[Katz] merely assumes away the paradox, which is in part that often what the
blackmailer threatens to do is a moral right."); Julie Turner, Book Note, Ill-Gotten Gains: Evasion,
Blackmail, Fraud, and Kindred Puzzles of the Law by Leo Katz, 84 CAL. L. REv. 1492, 1494-95 (1996)
("Katz seems to assume what he seeks to prove, namely that the paradox of blackmail can be resolved
to find a crime because the act of blackmail is a crime.").
172. Katz, supra note 6, at 1599 (arguing that a blackmailer's goal is to "take money without the
owner's consent").
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based on the claim that the blackmailee is not consenting to the payment. Yet it
is unclear how the threat of a mere "minor immorality"173 is sufficient to negate
the blackmailee's consent.
None of the above accounts of blackmail successfully demonstrates that one
of the components of a paradigmatic blackmail proposal is independently
immoral or illegal. The next section considers attempts to justify blackmail's
prohibition, not through locating an independent wrong in one of the compo-
nents of the proposal, but through the synergistic effect of the combination of
the components.
2. Wrong of Blackmail in the Combination of Components
a. Relations of Domination. Ronald Coase and George Fletcher argue that by
making the victim susceptible to repeated blackmail demands (after the victim
has initially paid), the blackmailer commits "moral murder" 174 and reduces the
blackmail victim to "a permanently subordinate position.' 75 The blackmailer
effecting a state of domination over the victim is properly within the law's
ambit to counteract. 176 As Fletcher notes, his focus on the domination stemming
from the prospect of repeated demands neatly accounts for why the transaction
in the Baseball Example is permissible. 77 The father avoids being subjugated,
because once the baseball is purchased, the dealer cannot effect a state of
domination by making repeated demands. 178 But Fletcher's account is overinclu-
sive by supporting the criminalization of a variation on the Baseball Example,
in which the dealer is only willing to rent the baseball' 79 on a daily basis and
makes escalating (and exorbitant) rental demands. Because the dealer effects a
relation of domination over the father, Fletcher's approach cannot explain that
transaction's permissibility. 80 Coase's and Fletcher's accounts are also underin-
clusive in failing to explain the wrong of a single, nonrepetitive instance of
blackmail.' 8'
173. Id. at 1598.
174. Coase, supra note 3, at 675 ("[I1n the ordinary blackmail case there is no end. The victim, once
he succumbs to the blackmailer, remains in his grip for an indefinite period.").
175. Fletcher, supra note 13, at 1626.
176. Id. at 1626-29.
177. Id. at 1627 (asserting that this domination/subordination "theory proves its mettle in neatly
accounting for why a tough one-shot transaction cannot be considered criminal blackmail").
178. Id. at 1627 ("Once the parent purchases the baseball, the seller.., can demand nothing further.
In no sense does the parent place herself in ongoing subordination to the seller, and there is thus no
criminal wrong in demanding an exorbitant price for the baseball.").
179. See Mack, supra note 21, at 273 (supplying a variation on the Baseball Example in which the
baseball is rented rather than purchased).
180. If the impossibility of repeated demands precludes a state of domination from arising, then the
continued repetition of the rental fee suffices for a relationship of domination to arise and thereby
constitutes blackmail under Fletcher's theory. See Smith, supra note 20, at 889 (critiquing Fletcher's
account on a similar basis).
181. See Fletcher, supra note 13, at 1626, 1637-38 (acknowledging this criticism). In addition,
blackmailers may be foreclosed from effectively making repeated demands. See Berman, supra note 10,
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Even if blackmailers' domination of victims was a sufficient account of
blackmail's criminalization, victims might be better protected through decrimi-
nalization of blackmail. If decriminalized, a blackmail contract would be enforce-
able, the blackmailer's promise of concealment would be binding, and breaches
would be remediable.182 Therefore, a blackmailer would not be able to disclose
the information, after the blackmailee paid once and refused a second demand
for payment, without sustaining civil liability for breach of contract. 
1 83
b. Evidence of Bad Motive. Mitchell Berman has recently argued that black-
mail harms, or threatens to harm, the victim and that utterance of the proposal
evidences the blackmailer's bad motive or mens rea. Berman contends that but
for First Amendment concerns and the difficulties of ascertaining motive,
disclosures of embarrassing information might well be criminalized as legally
cognizable harms. 184 As Berman explains, "blackmail is a conditional threat to
perform a legal but harmful act under circumstances where the threat itself
provides reason for making the act [of disclosure] criminal by suggesting that
the actor would be inflicting harm knowingly and without good motives."'18 As
a result, the prohibition of blackmail fits easily within the criminal law's
province of prohibiting ill-motivated harms. 1
86
There are a number of difficulties with Berman's approach. First, while it is
clear that blackmail can, as Berman asserts, harm the victim, Berman's ap-
proach fails to establish that it constitutes an impermissible harm. In the
Baseball Example, by threatening to not sell the baseball unless an exorbitant
price is paid, the dealer harms the father financially. The harm is deemed
permissible, however, because the father does not have a right to obtain the
baseball at any particular price. Though harmed, the father does not have a right
not to be harmed in that way. As Murphy explains, "a moral concept (a right) is
required for the explication of the concept of harm. Thus it is this concept (a
at 825 (supplying an example of a judicial nominee on the eve of Senate confirmation threatened with
disclosure of an indiscretion that the nominee does not fear being disclosed after the confirmation vote);
Smith, supra note 20, at 889 (offering an example of a victim threatened with disclosure of an
embarrassing "nonreproducible and decaying photograph" but with little potential that the demand will
be repeated, because the photograph is about to completely decompose).
182. Mack, supra note 21, at 284 n.13 ("Decriminalization would, incidentally, allow for the legal
enforcement of contracts binding the blackmailer to silence. Thus, the blackmailer would no longer be
able to sell his silence, 'again, and again, and again-endlessly."' (quoting Murphy, supra note 6, at
166)); Owens, supra note 6, at 509 (discussing enforcement of blackmail contracts). Owens explains
how victims would benefit by decriminalizing blackmail: "If such contracts were legally recognized,
then any breach of the contract by the blackmailer would be followed by compensation for the
blackmailee." Id.
183. For other criticisms of Fletcher's theory, see Fletcher, supra note 13, at 1635 & n.45 (conceding
that domination is not always a sufficient condition for criminalizing conduct); Lindgren, supra note 2,
at 1978 (noting that Fletcher's theory fails to distinguish between permissible and impermissible
relations of domination).
184. Berman, supra note 10, at 851.
185. Id. at 848 (footnote omitted).
186. Id.
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right) which must be at the center of attention."' 8 7 Thus the father is not harmed
"in the morally loaded sense."' 188 Similarly, though a blackmail victim may be
harmed by the disclosure, no right of the blackmailee is violated by being
harmed in that way. Or, alternatively, a legally cognizable harm must not merely
be a harm but a wrongful, impermissible, or rights-violating harm. 189 Because a
blackmailer, the press, and others may have the right to disclose the truthful but
harmful information, 90 the blackmail victim is harmed but is not wrongfully
harmed.
Second, Berman's account fails to distinguish blackmail from permissible
transactions. In attempting to distinguish blackmail from a hard, but permis-
sible, bargain, similar to the Baseball Example, Berman contends that the seller
does not cause harm, because the purchaser has no legally protected interest in
the item and thus the dealer cannot cause any "legally cognizable harm."' 9 ' But
by this same reasoning, the blackmailer threatening a legal act, albeit one which
may cause harm, is neither threatening nor causing any "legally cognizable
harm."'
19 2
Third, Berman's rationale is underinclusive in failing to explain why black-
mail for good motives is nonetheless punished. Think of a Robin Hood of
blackmailers. 93 Blackmail may also involve mixed motives. For example, Max
187. Murphy, supra note 6, at 161.
188. Id. at 162.
189. See Lindgren, supra note 2, at 1981 ("[l]f one takes the standard idea that the criminal law is
based on harm plus wrongful intent, I think that whether something counts as harm often turns on
whether it's wrong."); see also Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of
Retribution, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1659, 1661-85 (1992) (distinguishing between harms and wrongs);
Lamond, supra note 43, at 237 (distinguishing between harm and wrongful harm). For a critique of
Berman's account of harm, see Scalise, supra note 21, at 1493 ("Berman's conception of 'harm,'
however, is very broad, and it is applied in an ad hoc fashion.").
190. See Murphy, supra note 6, at 162 ("[T]he fact that (e.g.) the press may reveal that you have
performed acts of type Y [which are inconsistent with your good reputation] shows that your right to a
good reputation is, at most, a fairly weak right.").
191. Berman, supra note 10, at 856.
192. See Smith, supra note 20, at 886 (contending that the immediate harm to the blackmail victim
can neither explain blackmail's criminalization nor account for the distinction between the Baseball
Example and blackmail).
193. Perhaps the prohibition against blackmail has flourished to prevent just such class-based wealth
redistributions:
[T]he crime of blackmail is one which is so threatening, such a cause of anxiety (and
consequently gets such enormous sentences) because it is a crime of empowerment by the
powerless which disrupts and transgresses normal power relationships in a way which is far
more serious (since it lingers) than a short act of violence.... The argument would be that
blackmail is a crime to protect a particular class (people with money, who care about their
reputations) from those from whom in the normal course of events their privileged position
makes them immune. That is why it is so threatening and that is why it gets such heavy
sentences.
Alldridge, supra note 4, at 373; see Murphy, supra note 6, at 167 n.l (observing that blackmail "was
originally perceived in class terms: the crime of a lower order person against a gentleman"); Smilansky,
supra note 43, at 118-19 ("Part of the explanation for the perplexing attitude of common-sense
morality on this issue is probably cynical, e.g. that the thought of being blackmailed in the ordinary
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was a mean-spirited gossip who (unconditionally) disclosed true but embarrass-
ing information causing much suffering among the victims of his gossip. A
newspaper then hires Max to stop disclosing it for free and to publish it in the
newspaper. Subsequently learning of the great suffering he was causing, Max
would sometimes offer to not publish the gossip if the subject of the gossip
would pay him the same amount as the newspaper. Everyone to whom Max
made the offer was happy for receiving it and paid him. Max was then arrested
for blackmail. 194 The difficulty this presents for Berman's emphasis on motive
is that Max's motive is worst while his conduct is perfectly legal (spreading
gossip for free or selling it to the newspaper). It is only when his motive is, in
part, compassion for the victim of the gossip that his conduct become illegal,
that is, blackmail.' 95 Bad motive hardly seems to be the key to explaining
blackmail's prohibition if threats involving mixed motives and good motives
nonetheless constitute blackmail.
c. Use of Another's Bargaining Chips. James Lindgren's much-discussed ac-
count describes blackmailers as threatening "victims with harm and us[ing]
other people's leverage for their own gain. While neither may always be wrong
in itself, the combination is wrong." 196 Lindgren explains that the "blackmailer
attempts to gain an advantage in return for suppressing someone else's actual or
potential interest. The blackmailer is negotiating for his own gain with someone
else's leverage or bargaining chips."' 197 For example, a blackmailer seeking
money from an adulterer upon penalty of disclosure to the adulterer's spouse is
employing leverage not of his own but the information interests or bargaining
chips of the adulterer's spouse.' 98
Lindgren's theory has provoked substantial criticism. First, as Lindgren
acknowledges, why the use of someone else's bargaining chips is unlawful or
criminal is not fully explained.' 99 Moreover, even if the use of someone else's
chips is immoral or criminal, Lindgren fails to account for how someone comes
to acquire this leverage or bargaining chip apart from the effect of blackmail's
criminalization.2 ° Second, Lindgren's approach is underinclusive in accounting
ways is frightening to the rich and powerful in society, who may be less concerned with [hard economic
bargains] .... ).
194. Smilansky, supra note 43, at 116-17 (supplying the example).
195. See id. at 118.
196. Lindgren, supra note 2, at 1988.
197. Lindgren, supra note 1, at 702.
198. See Lindgren, supra note 2, at 1977-78.
199. Id. at 1988 (conceding that while his account is descriptively accurate, it is normatively weak).
For similar criticisms of Lindgren's theory, see, for example, Berman, supra note 10, at 823-24 ("[I]ts
normative appeal is extremely weak ... because he provides no reason why using someone else's
leverage for individual gain should be unlawful, let alone criminal."); and Hardin, supra note 23, at
1792 ("The chief weakness in Lindgren's claim is that he simply posits the chip argument as inherently
moral. Perhaps it is. But the argument lacks demonstration in some moral theory.").
200. Isenbergh, supra note 1, at 1917-18 ("[Lindgren's] theory of blackmail starts by finding
existing leverage in C[, a third party], but does not account for how or why it is there. What, beyond the
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for examples which would seem to constitute blackmail despite the absence of
misappropriation of another's bargaining chips: "Pay me $10,000-or I will
cause bad blood at our club, seduce your fianc[6], persuade your son to enlist,
give your daughter a motorcycle, or leave the Catholic Church.",20 ' And third, in
some instances of blackmail there is no third party, and thus there are no chips
to be leveraged.2 °2
d. Coercion. As Jeffrie Murphy has noted, "coercion of one citizen by another
is the very thing which it is the criminal law's primary job to prevent., 20 3 If
coercion 20 4 is prima facie wrongful and if blackmail proposals are coercive,
there is ample justification for blackmail's criminalization.20 5 The focus has
been on closing the gap between the "plain vanilla" 206 coercion in obviously
coercive offenses such as robbery and the more subtle coercion, if any, in
blackmail. 0 7 The gap is that while the robber threatens an unlawful act, the
blackmailer threatens a lawful act.20 8 According to Lindgren, what is needed,
but is lacking, is a broader theory of coercion which could accommodate
prohibition of blackmail itself, gives C leverage that C would not otherwise have with respect to
information concerning A[, the blackmailee]?").
201. Katz, supra note 6, at 1581 ("In none of these cases is it easy to see in what sense the
perpetrator is playing with someone else's bargaining chips."); see Berman, supra note 10, at 823 n.93
("Consider, for example, a threat by Nazis to march in Skokie unless the town's residents buy them off
with a large cash payment. I assume that this is blackmail. If so, the Nazis are merely leveraging their
own constitutional rights .... ").
202. See Lamond, supra note 43, at 235 ("[Lindgren's] analysis is unable to account for cases where
no third party is involved, for instance where P proposes to do something to herself (such as commit
suicide) .... "). For a variety of other criticisms of Lindgren's approach, see FEINBERG, supra note 1, at
365 n.68; Block & Gordon, supra note 21, at 51-54; Brown, supra note 135, at 1965-66; DeLong,
supra note 43, at 1681; Fletcher, supra note 13, at 1624-26; Smith, supra note 20, at 885-87.
203. Murphy, supra note 6, at 156.
204. Whether certain conduct or speech is sufficient to constitute coercion or impermissible coercion
may depend on the specific means used in the coercion and what the person is coerced into doing.
Generally, but not always, it is thought that threats, but not offers, are eligible to be coercive. This is
because threats are generally defined as restricting a person's options or opportunities; in contrast,
offers expand a person's options and opportunities. For general accounts of coercion, see Peter Westen,
'Freedom'and 'Coercion'-Virtue Words and Vice Words, 1895 Duke L.J. 541 (1985); 3 JOEL FEINBERG,
THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM To SELF 191-268 (1986); WERTHEIMER, supra note 54;
Mitchell N. Berman, The Normative Functions of Coercion Claims, 8 LEGAL THEORY 45 (2002). For a
comprehensive typology distinguishing coercive threats from related proposals, see Kent Greenawalt,
Criminal Coercion and Freedom of Speech, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 1081, 1095-1102 (1983).
205. See Berman, supra note 10, at 831.
206. Leo Katz's helpful term "'[p]lain [v]anilla' coercion" refers to the type of straightforward,
uncontroversial coercion ascribed to offenses, such as robbery and extortion, that threaten unlawful
acts. Katz, supra note 6, at 1574.
207. See id. at 1576 ("A number of scholars have offered ingenious suggestions seeking to supply
the missing link between standard cases of coercion and blackmail.").
208. Katz explains how robbery is clearly coercive, but blackmail is not:
The robber coerces because he offers to sell you back what he has first unlawfully taken from
you-the chance to go on living.
... Not so the blackmailer threatening to disclose the victim's infidelity. The victim doesn't
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blackmail.2 0 9 But if existing approaches to coercion are underinclusive in
failing to identify the coerciveness in blackmail, 2 '0 broadening our conception
of coercion to accommodate blackmail runs the risk of being overinclusive by
construing hard, but permissible, bargains (like the Baseball Example) as
coercive. As Jennifer Brown observes, "[t]hat the blackmailee may be faced
with a hard choice ... does not necessarily make the blackmail any more
coercive than the choice facing many parties to wholly legitimate economic
transactions. '2 ' If blackmail's prohibition is to rest on coercion, then what is
needed (but which is lacking) is an account of coercion that includes blackmail
as coercive but excludes permissible economic transactions.212
Though nonconsequentialist approaches insist that consequentialist explana-
tions of blackmail are inadequate because blackmail is intrinsically-rather than
instrumentally-wrong, nonconsequentialist accounts have similarly failed to
satisfactorily explain blackmail. Nonconsequentialist theories have failed to (i)
find an individual component which is, or should be, immoral or criminal, and
(ii) explicate how independently permissible components have a synergistic or
combinatorial effect of impermissibility.
II. META-BLACKMAIL AS MORE SERIOUS THAN BLACKMAIL
Because, as was seen in Part I, none of the existing theories and accounts of
blackmail address the phenomenon of meta-blackmail, or proposals threatening
blackmail, the next three parts undertake a comparative assessment of blackmail
and meta-blackmail. The three logically possible approaches consider whether
meta-blackmail is a more serious, equivalent, or less serious level of criminal-
ity.21 3 At considerable risk of oversimplification, proponents of consequentialist
own the right to control the blackmailer's communications with his wife; the blackmailer
does. The blackmailer, unlike the robber, is selling something he owns.
Id. at 1574, 1576 (footnotes omitted). Katz, however, subsequently hints that blackmail might be
coercive. See id. at 1599; see also Smith, supra note 20, at 888-89 (interpreting Katz's theory as based
on coercion, Smith argues that it fails to distinguish between permissible and impermissible coercion
and thus cannot distinguish the permissibility of the Baseball Example from the impermissibility of
blackmail).
209. See Lindgren, supra note 2, at 1986 ("Either blackmail isn't coercive or most of the traditional
definitions of coercion are too narrow. I choose the latter.").
210. For notable attempts to establish blackmail as coercive, see WERTHEIMER, supra note 54, at
102-03, 219 (conceding that his account fails to establish blackmail as coercive); and Robert Nozick,
Coercion, in PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE, AND METHOD: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ERNEST NAGEL 440, 452 & n.34
(Sidney Morgenbesser et al. eds., 1969) (failing to reach a conclusion as to whether blackmail is
coercive).
211. Brown, supra note 135, at 1950 n.32.
212. See Lindgren, supra note 2, at 1989 ("Perhaps a better understanding of coercion would unravel
the mysteries of blackmail-or a better understanding of blackmail would unravel the mysteries of
coercion.").
213. One might argue that there is a fourth logically possible outcome of the comparison: meta-
blackmail is not a crime at all. This possible outcome, however, is assumed to be encompassed within
the third possible outcome-that meta-blackmail is a less serious level of criminality than conventional
blackmail. That is, if meta-blackmail is not a criminal offense then it constitutes a less serious level of
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accounts of blackmail will tend to favor the functionalist approach of treating
meta-blackmail and conventional blackmail as equivalent.21 4 Proponents of
nonconsequentialist accounts of blackmail will tend to favor either the formalist
approach of treating meta-blackmail as more serious or the substantivist ap-
proach of treating meta-blackmail as less serious. 2I5 Though each of the three
approaches is plausible when considered individually, none of the approaches is
plausible when considered jointly due to each approach's conflict with the other
approaches.
A. THE FORMALIST APPROACH
The formalist approach focuses on the formal feature differentiating meta-
blackmail and conventional blackmail.2 1 6 Because meta-blackmail threatens an
criminality than conventional blackmail. Another possible basis for questioning whether there are only
three logically possible outcomes occurs when the meta-blackmail proposal and conventional blackmail
proposal differ on a basis other than the threatened act. This objection can be neutralized by specifying
that for any given conventional blackmail proposal and its corresponding meta-blackmail proposal (in
other words, the only difference between the two proposals is the threatened act), there are only three
logically possible outcomes as to the comparative assessment of their level of criminality.
214. See Pildes, supra note 36, at 609 & n.7 (equating consequentialism and law-and-economics
scholarship with functionalism); see also Larry Alexander, "With Me, its All er Nuthin'"." Formalism in
Law and Morality, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 530, 556 (1999) ("No one disputes that consequentialist
moralities . . . are nonformalistic.").
215. Compare Alexander, supra note 214, at 560 (explaining nonconsequentialism as substantive),
with Leo Katz, Form and Substance in Law and Morality, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 566, 570 (1999)
(describing nonconsequentialism as "both substantive and formalistic").
216. Katz contends that the particular form or "path" of a transaction or some conduct may be
crucial in determining its permissibility or impermissibility. Katz, supra note 6, at 1604-05. To
demonstrate the significance of the form of the conduct in determining its permissibility, Katz considers
two hypotheticals made famous by Judith Jarvis Thomson. In the first, the "trolley case," the brakes of a
trolley fail and the driver has the choice of continuing on the present track where five people will be
killed by the runaway trolley or the driver can turn onto another track where only one person will be
killed. Most agree the trolley driver may permissibly turn the trolley onto the other track where only
one will be killed. Here it is permissible (and preferable) to kill the one to save the five. But in the
second case, the "transplant case," a surgeon has five patients who are about to die for lack of transplant
organs unless an innocent, perfectly healthy patient's organs are extracted. In this second case most
agree that the one should not be killed to save the five. Katz suggests that our intuitions on whether to
kill the one innocent to save the five differ in the two cases because of the different form of each case.
Thus in determining the permissibility of conduct or a transaction, "a lot can turn on form." Id. at 1605.
For Thomson's comparison of the two cases, see Judith Jarvis Thomson, Killing, Letting Die, and the
Trolley Problem, in RIGHTS, RESTITUTION, AND RISK: ESSAYS IN MORAL THEORY 78, 80-93 (William
Parent ed., 1986). For the first discussion of these cases, see PHILIPPA FOOT, VIRTUES AND VICES AND
OTHER ESSAYS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 23-24 (Clarendon Press 2002) (1978).
The form of the blackmail transaction may be crucial in determining whether the transaction is
permissible or criminal. For example, if Blackmailer merely shows Victim pictures of Victim engaging
in adultery, unconditionally threatens to disclose them and Victim offers to pay for their nondisclosure,
Blackmailer perhaps would not be guilty of blackmail or any crime whatsoever. But, of course,
something like blackmail has nonetheless occurred. See, e.g., KATZ, supra note 1, at 169-71; Berman,
supra note 10, at 867-70. But cf Larry Alexander, Is Morality Like the Tax Code?, 95 MICH. L. REV.
1839, 1843-44 (1997) (reviewing KATz, supra note 1) (suggesting that a similar transaction might
constitute the criminal offense of blackmail). This is sometimes referred to as the "second paradox":
why are blackmailer-initiated offers of concealment for money unlawful and blackmailee-initiated
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unlawful act and conventional blackmail threatens a lawful act, meta-blackmail
should be treated as a more serious level of criminality than conventional
blackmail. This formal difference in the status of each proposal's threatened act
allows meta-blackmail to be more easily justified (in a technical sense) as
criminal,21 7 to constitute the greater crime of robbery, and to be clearly coer-
cive.
1. Meta-Blackmail as Robbery
Under some statutory formulations, meta-blackmail qualifies as the offense of
robbery, a comparatively more serious offense than conventional blackmail. For
example, the California statutory scheme defines robbery as a "felonious taking
... accomplished by means of force or fear.",218 The "felonious taking" compo-
nent is satisfied by "a specific intent to permanently deprive the victim of the
property., 21 9 The requisite fear is "[t]he fear of an unlawful injury to the person
or property of the person robbed. ' 220 Injury to property is best understood as
"the incurring of a pecuniary loss. ''22I By threatening to commit the unlawful
act of blackmail, meta-blackmail places the recipient in fear of an unlawful
offers of money for concealment lawful? See DeLong, supra note 43, at 1664-65 (terming the latter a
"legal 'bribe"'). For a magisterial account of the law and history of bribes, see JOHN T. NOONAN, JR.,
BRIBES (1984). What is the difference? In both, the blackmailee exchanges money for the blackmailer's
concealment of the information. Other than their different forms, there is no widely accepted, principled
reason to account for the different legal status of the two proposals. For the view that the inability to
satisfactorily distinguish the blackmailer-initiated transaction from the blackmailee-initiated transaction
supports decriminalization of blackmail, see MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, THE ETHIcs OF LIBERTY 125 (1998).
For the view that the "second paradox" should not be resolved by criminalizing blackmailee-initiated
exchanges, see Kathryn H. Christopher, Toward a Resolution of Blackmail's Second Paradox, 37 ARIz.
ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2006).
To further support the significance of the form or path of the conduct or transaction, Katz offers the
following fascinating hypothetical:
[Anatole steals] a sack of money from a bank, containing $100,000 .... He sends the bank a
note which reads: Promise to pay me a reward of ten percent for the money I shall be
returning, or else you will see none of it ever again. The bank is only too happy to agree....
Under my analysis, he would now be guilty of the blackmail of $10,000, in addition to the
theft of the $100,000. The reason that is apt to seem strange is this: Imagine that rather than
asking for a ten percent commission, Anatole had simply removed $10,000 from the bag, and
returned $90,000 to the bank. Now he would be guilty only of the theft, and quite possibly
would have his guilt mitigated by the partial return of the money. The fact that he got $10,000
out of it would not be considered to aggravate his guilt. How can the result be different if he
returns the money in exchange for $10,000, when in the end it really comes to the same thing?
Katz, supra note 6, at 1603-04. For Katz, the answer is that the permissibility or blameworthiness of
two functionally equivalent transactions or courses of action may vary for no other reason than the
particular forms they take.
217. See supra notes 27, 29-30 and infra Part VB.
218. CAL. PENAL CODE § 211 (West 1999).
219. People v. Torres, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 103, 110 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
220. CAL. PENAL CODE § 212 (West 1999) (emphasis added).
221. See Note, A Rationale of the Law of Aggravated Theft, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 84, 90 (1954). The
Note further explains that despite the lack of case law, "[c]learly within the ban are threats to commit
acts independently criminal .... Id. at 91.
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injury to his property-namely, the pecuniary loss entailed by paying the
demanded sum. If the recipient of meta-blackmail fails to make the demanded
payment, meta-blackmail would constitute attempted robbery which is classified
as second-degree robbery.22 If the recipient makes the demanded payment, then
meta-blackmail might even constitute first-degree robbery.223 Because the threat-
ened act in conventional blackmail-disclosure of the secret-is not unlawful,
conventional blackmail fails to place the recipient in fear of an unlawful injury.
Therefore, conventional blackmail fails to constitute any type of robbery under
the California statutory scheme. That meta-blackmail may constitute robbery,
but conventional blackmail does not, is also true in a number of other jurisdic-
224tions.
2. Meta-Blackmail as Coercive
Meta-blackmail shares the "plain vanilla" coerciveness 225 of unproblemati-
cally coercive offenses such as robbery because it threatens an unlawful act.
222. California sets out the following degrees of robbery and their respective punishments:
(a) Robbery is punishable as follows:
(1) Robbery of the first degree...
(2) Robbery of the second degree is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for two,
three, or five years.
(b) [AIttempted robbery in violation of paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) is punishable by
imprisonment in the state prison.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 213 (West 1999); see also id. § 212.5(c) ("All kinds of robbery other than those
listed in subdivisions (a) and (b) are of the second degree."). Thus, the mere utterance of meta-
blackmail, even if the recipient did not make the demanded payment, would constitute second-degree
robbery.
223. For example, if the meta-blackmail transaction takes place inside an "inhabited dwelling
house," it could constitute first-degree robbery. See id. § 212.5.
224. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6501 (2004) (defining robbery as a "felonious taking ...
accomplished by means of force or fear"); id. § 18-6502 (defining the requisite fear as "fear of an
unlawful injury to the person or property of the person robbed"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 791 (West
2002) (defining robbery as a "wrongful taking ... accomplished by means of force or fear"); id. § 794
(defining the requisite fear as "fear of an unlawful injury ... to the person or property of the person
robbed"). Both the Idaho and Oklahoma robbery statutes are similar to California's robbery provisions.
And under these statutes, the presence of a threat to commit an unlawful act in meta-blackmail would
qualify meta-blackmail as robbery. The absence of a threat to commit an unlawful act in conventional
blackmail would disqualify conventional blackmail as constituting robbery.
Examination of Montana statutes reaches the same result-meta-blackmail, but not conventional
blackmail, constituting the offense of robbery-but in a different way. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§
45-5-401(1), (1)(c) (2003) (defining robbery as "in the course of committing a theft, the person ...
commits or threatens immediately to commit any felony other than theft"); id. §§ 45-5-203(1), (1)(c)
(defining the felony offense of Intimidation as a "threat to perform without lawful authority any
felony"). Because meta-blackmail threatens to commit the act of blackmail, which may be classified as
the nontheft felony offense of Intimidation, meta-blackmail may qualify as robbery. In contrast,
conventional blackmail would fail to qualify as robbery in Montana because the threatened act of
disclosure of a secret is neither a felony nor unlawful.
225. For a discussion of coercion, see supra Part I.B.2.d. For further discussion of "plain vanilla"
coercion, see supra notes 206-08 and accompanying text.
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Conventional blackmail is not clearly coercive precisely because it threatens
merely a lawful act. Since meta-blackmail is clearly coercive and conventional
blackmail is not, meta-blackmail should constitute the more serious level of
criminality.
B. PUZZLES
Treating meta-blackmail as more serious than blackmail is supported by (i)
the formalist interpretive strategy, (ii) the intuition that conditional threats to
commit unlawful acts are more serious than those to commit lawful acts, (iii)
meta-blackmail (but not conventional blackmail) constituting the greater crime
of robbery, and (iv) meta-blackmail (but not conventional blackmail) qualifying
as clearly coercive.22 6 This support would seem to make the formalist approach
a plausible, if not compelling, way to comparatively assess meta-blackmail and
conventional blackmail.
Despite this support, however, the formalist approach generates two puzzles
due to its conflict with the other two approaches. First, by virtue of its conflict
with the functionalist approach, 227 how can meta-blackmail be a more serious
level of criminality if meta-blackmail and conventional blackmail are function-
ally equivalent? Second, by virtue of its conflict with the substantivist ap-
proach,228 how can a conditional threat to threaten be more serious, ceteris
paribus, than a conditional threat? Or alternatively, why is threatening blackmail
more serious than actually committing blackmail?
Treating meta-blackmail as more serious than conventional blackmail also
generates anomalies within the family of conditional-threat theft offenses.
Proposals threatening robbery are not more serious than committing robbery.
For example, let us compare robbery proposals paralleling the form of conven-
tional blackmail and meta-blackmail. A conventional robbery proposal is, "If
you do not give me your money, then I will immediately kill or seriously harm
you. '' 229 A meta-robbery proposal is, "If you do not give me your money, then I
will immediately rob you." Under some robbery statutes, in which a (condi-
tional) threat to commit a serious felony constitutes robbery,230 meta-robbery
would also constitute robbery. Under other robbery statutes, specifically requir-
226. For an important additional argument in support of treating meta-blackmail as a more serious
level of criminality than conventional blackmail, but which is not expressed in formalistic terms, see
infra notes 236-42 and accompanying text.
227. For a brief introduction to the functionalist approach of treating meta-blackmail and conven-
tional blackmail as equivalent in seriousness of criminality, see supra text following note 44. For a
more expansive discussion of the functionalist approach, see infra Part III.A.
228. For a brief introduction to the substantivist approach of treating meta-blackmail as less serious
than conventional blackmail, see supra text following note 45. For a more expansive discussion of the
substantivist approach, see infra Part IV.A.
229. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
230. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 222. l(1)(c) (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985).
2006]
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
ing a threat to commit homicide or serious bodily harm,2 31 meta-robbery would
not constitute robbery, but rather merely extortion. That is, threatening robbery
would either be the same crime as robbery itself or a lesser crime. But unlike
meta-blackmail as compared to conventional blackmail, in no way would
meta-robbery be a greater crime than conventional robbery.
III. META-BLACKMAIL AS EQUIVALENT TO BLACKMAIL
A. THE FUNCTIONALIST APPROACH
To avoid the difficulties of the formalist approach, meta-blackmail and
conventional blackmail might be considered as equivalent in seriousness of
criminality. Supporting their equivalence is the functionalist approach. 32 Rather
than assessing the two proposals based on the presence or absence of a threat to
commit an unlawful act, the functionalist approach views them from the perspec-
tive of their function or effect. 233 Though different in form, both proposals are
functionally equivalent-both conventional blackmail and meta-blackmail pro-
pose, in effect, exchanging nondisclosure of the secret for money.
Their equivalence may be seen by unpacking meta-blackmail. Although
formally meta-blackmail threatens blackmail, the threatened act of blackmail
itself may be unpacked (in the context of the hypothetical) as a threat to disclose
the secret. As a result, meta-blackmail may be understood as a threat to threaten
to disclose the secret. In effect and function, a threat to threaten to disclose the
secret arguably boils down to a threat to disclose the secret, which is no
different than conventional blackmail. As functional equivalents, meta-
blackmail and conventional blackmail should be treated as equivalent in serious-
ness of criminality.
Alternatively, their equivalence may be seen by construing meta-blackmail as
a doubly conditional threat to disclose the secret. That is, meta-blackmail may
be construed as, "If you do not give me $1000, then (if you do not give me
$1000, then I will disclose your adulterous relationship)." Under this interpreta-
tion of meta-blackmail, the threatened act of disclosure of the secret is subject
to not just one condition but two. But because the two conditions are identical-
both conditions are nonpayment of the money-the second condition is duplica-
tive and redundant. Arguably, a doubly conditional threat is equivalent to a
singly conditional threat where, as here, all the conditions are identical. As a
231. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3426 (1995) ("Robbery is the taking of property from the
person or presence of another by force or by threat of bodily harm to any person."); see also LAFAVE,
supra note 28.
232. For a discussion of the significance of the distinction between form and function, see supra
note 216.
233. For an example of the view that proposals different in form, but equivalent in function, may be
treated equivalently, see ROTHBARD, supra note 216, at 125 (arguing that while different in form, both
blackmailer-initiated proposals offering silence for money and blackmailee-initiated proposals offering
money for silence should be treated equivalently-both should be lawful).
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result, what may be understood as a doubly conditional threat (meta-blackmail)
is equivalent to a singly conditional threat (conventional blackmail).
B. PUZZLES
Treating meta-blackmail and conventional blackmail as equivalent is sup-
ported by (i) the functionalist interpretive strategy, (ii) a conditional threat to
threaten being equivalent to a conditional threat, (iii) a doubly conditional threat
being equivalent to a singly conditional threat where all the conditions are
identical, and (iv) the intuition that functionally equivalent proposals should be
treated equivalently. This support would seem to make the functionalist ap-
proach a plausible, if not compelling, way to comparatively assess meta-
blackmail and conventional blackmail.
Despite this support, however, the functionalist approach generates two
puzzles due to its conflict with the other two approaches. First, by virtue of the
functionalist approach's conflict with the substantivist approach,234 how can a
conditional threat to threaten be equivalent to, ceteris paribus, a conditional
threat? Or alternatively, how can threatening blackmail be equivalent, ceteris
paribus, to actually committing blackmail? Second, by virtue of its conflict with
the formalist approach, 235 how can threatening an unlawful act be equivalent to,
ceteris paribus, threatening a lawful act?236 A defender of the functionalist
approach might reply that the latter puzzle is only problematic from the
perspective of an empty, legalistic formalism.
The puzzle, however, may be restated in nonformalistic terms. Consider the
following argument that meta-blackmail is a more serious level of criminality
than conventional blackmail:
1. If committing act A is more serious than committing act B, then a
conditional threat to commit act A is more serious, ceteris paribus, than a
conditional threat to commit act B.237
234. For an expansive discussion of the substantivist approach (treating meta-blackmail as a less
serious level of criminality than conventional blackmail), see infra Part IV.A.
235. For a discussion of the formalist approach (treating meta-blackmail as a more serious level of
criminality than conventional blackmail), see supra Part II.A.
236. Alternatively, the puzzle might be expressed as how can conditionally threatening to do that
which one has a right to do be equivalent to, ceteris paribus, conditionally threatening to do that which
one does not have a right to do? That is, how can conventional blackmail (in which one threatens what
one has a right to do-to disclose another's secret) be equivalent to meta-blackmail (in which one
threatens what one does not have a right to do-to commit the crime of blackmail)?
237. This premise is supported by the intuition that given conditional threat proposals with the same
demand, those proposals with a more harmful or wrongful threatened act will properly be considered a
more serious a level of criminality. This intuition is consistent with the criminal law's treatment of
robbery and extortion. Consider the following robbery and extortion proposals. Robbery: "If you do not
give me $1000, then I will kill you." Extortion: "If you do not give me $1000, then I will bum down
your business." Despite the same demand component in each proposal (the demand for $1000), robbery
is properly viewed as the more serious crime than extortion, see infra notes 249-52 and accompanying
text, because the threatened act in robbery (homicide) is more serious than that threatened in extortion
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2. The act of committing blackmail is properly considered more serious than
the act of disclosing another's embarrassing secret.23 8
3. Therefore, a conditional threat to commit blackmail is more serious,
ceteris paribus, than a conditional threat to disclose a secret.
239
4. Therefore, meta-blackmail is more serious, ceteris paribus, than conven-
tional blackmail.
240
The argument advances the same conclusion as the formalist approach, but does
so in nonformalistic terms. As a result, to opt for the functionalist approach that
meta-blackmail and conventional blackmail are equivalent requires one to
explain in what way this argument is wrong.24' The second puzzle of the
functionalist approach may then be reformulated as follows: how can a condi-
tional threat to commit a more serious act be equivalent, ceteris paribus, to a
conditional threat to commit a less serious act?
242
(arson). Thus, to deny this premise requires one to deny the typical way in which robbery and extortion
are differentiated. As a result, few if any should find this premise objectionable.
238. See, e.g., Altman, supra note 51, at 1657 (noting that committing blackmail is more harmful
than merely (unconditionally) disclosing another's embarrassing secret). This premise is supported by,
though does not exclusively rely on, the act of committing blackmail being criminalized and the
(unconditional) act of disclosing another's secret being entirely lawful. In addition, the premise is
supported by the widely held view that the act of blackmail is properly criminalized, see supra notes 6,
21, and accompanying text, and that (unconditionally) disclosing another's embarrassing secret is
properly lawful as governed by the First Amendment and other considerations. See supra text
accompanying note 184. Thus, to deny this premise one must either believe that blackmail should be
decriminalized or that the disclosure of another's embarrassing secret should be criminalized. Because
there are only a few that would be willing to decriminalize blackmail and perhaps none advocating the
criminalization of the unconditional disclosure of another's embarrassing secret, few (if any) should
find the premise objectionable.
239. This step follows from the premises in steps I and 2. If a conditional threat to commit a more
serious act will be more serious, ceteris paribus, than a conditional threat to commit a less serious act
(step 1), and committing blackmail is more serious than disclosing another's embarrassing secret (step
2), then a conditional threat to commit blackmail is more serious than a conditional threat to disclose
another's embarrassing secret. As a result, if one agrees with the presumably unobjectionable premises
in steps 1 and 2, see supra notes 237-38, step 3 should be unobjectionable.
240. This step follows from step 3. A threat to commit blackmail (conditioned upon the nonpayment
of the demanded money) we have termed meta-blackmail. A threat to disclose another's embarrassing
secret (conditioned upon the nonpayment of the demanded money) constitutes conventional blackmail.
Therefore, if a conditional threat to commit blackmail is more serious, ceteris paribus, than a
conditional threat to disclose another's embarrassing secret (step 3), then meta-blackmail is more
serious, ceteris paribus, than conventional blackmail. As a result, if one agrees with the presumably
unobjectionable premises in steps 1 and 2, and agrees with the presumably unobjectionable reasoning in
step 3, then step 4 is presumably unobjectionable.
241. Opting for the substantivist approach, see infra Part IV.A, would also trigger the burden to
explain away this argument on behalf of treating meta-blackmail as the more serious level of
criminality than conventional blackmail.
242. Even apart from its conflict with the formalist and substantivist approaches, an additional
difficulty remains. If under the functionalist approach conventional blackmail and meta-blackmail
should be treated as the same level of criminality, what should that level of criminality be? Because
meta-blackmail constitutes the greater crime of robbery in some jurisdictions, see supra Part II.A.l,
should both conventional blackmail and meta-blackmail be treated as robbery or should both be treated
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IV. META-BLACKMAIL AS LESS SERIOUS THAN BLACKMAIL
A. THE SUBSTANTIVIST APPROACH
To avoid the difficulties of treating meta-blackmail as more serious than, or
equivalent to, conventional blackmail, the only remaining option is treating
meta-blackmail as less serious. The substantivist approach views conventional
blackmail as a threat and meta-blackmail as a threat to threaten and thus
supports treating meta-blackmail as less serious on the basis that a threat to
threaten is less serious than a threat.2 43
Like the formalist approach, the substantivist approach views meta-blackmail
and conventional blackmail differently; but like the functionalist approach, the
substantivist approach disregards the differing surface forms of meta-blackmail
and conventional blackmail. 244 But while the substantivist approach shares the
functionalist approach's method of unpacking the threatened act in meta-
blackmail, each approach draws different conclusions. Where the functionalist
views a threat to threaten to disclose a secret as effectively collapsing into a
threat to disclose a secret, the substantivist finds a significant difference be-
tween a threat to threaten and a threat.
To appreciate the possible substantive difference between a threat and a threat
to threaten, understanding the relationship between consummated crimes, threats,
and threats to threaten may be helpful. If I purposely or knowingly kill someone
without any defense, for example, I have committed the crime of murder.245 If
instead of committing the consummated crime I merely (unconditionally) threaten
to murder someone, I might be guilty of the lesser offense of simple assault
24 6
or making terroristic threats.247 A threat to murder is a lesser offense than
murder because there simply is less harm.24 8 While a threat to murder may well
as blackmail? The functionalist approach can only inform that they should be treated as the same level
of criminality; it cannot inform us of what that level of criminality should be.
243. For a discussion of the significance of the distinction between form and substance, see KATZ,
supra note 1, at 10-12; Alexander, supra note 214, at 531; and Katz, supra note 215, at 570.
244. For an early example of the widely held view that substance should prevail over form, see
Barnes' Lessee v. Irwin, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 199, 203 (1793), reasoning that "[t]he substance, and not the
form, ought principally to be regarded."
245. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985) ("[C]rimi-
nal homicide constitutes murder when ... it is committed purposely or knowingly .... Murder is a
felony of the first degree .... ).
246. See, e.g., id. § 211.1 ("A person is guilty of assault if he [or she] ... attempts by physical
menace to put another in fear of imminent serious bodily injury."). While murder is a felony of the first
degree, see supra note 245, simple assault constitutes the lesser criminal offense category of misde-
meanor. Id. § 211.1(1).
247. See, e.g., id. § 211.3 ("A person is guilty of a felony of the third degree if he [or she] threatens
to commit any crime of violence with purpose to terrorize another .... ). While murder is a felony of
the first degree, see supra note 245, making a terroristic threat constitutes the lesser criminal offense
category of third-degree felony. Id. § 211.3.
248. Almost every jurisdiction worldwide imposes greater punishment for murder than attempted
murder. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 129
(rev. ed. 1988) (observing "the almost universal practice of legal systems of fixing a more severe
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develop, down the road, into an actual murder, the harm of a threat to murder is
more remote, indirect, and attenuated than actual murder.
This correlation between directness of harm and the seriousness of criminal-
ity explains the differentiation of robbery and extortion. Under most statutory
formulations, robbery and extortion are distinguished, in part, based on whether
the threat is to commit an act immediately or at some future time. 24 9 Even if
two proposals demand the same amount of money under the same threat of
death or serious bodily harm, the proposal purporting that the threatened act will
be carried out immediately or imminently will constitute robbery25 0 and be the
greater offense.2  If the same threatened act is purported to be carried out at a
later point in time, the proposal qualifies only as the lesser offense of extor-
tion. 2  Under these formulations of the offenses, extortion is treated as a lesser
offense than robbery, because the threatened harm is more remote and tempo-
rally distant than in robbery.
But what if rather than actually making a terroristic threat to commit crime X,
I merely threaten to make that terroristic threat? In a sense, I am threatening to
threaten to commit crime X. Just as a threat to commit crime X is a less serious
crime than actually committing crime X,253 presumably a threat to threaten to
commit crime X is an even lesser crime (if it is a crime at all). This is so for the
punishment for the completed crime than for the mere attempt"); Joel Feinberg, Equal Punishment for
Failed Attempts: Some Bad but Instructive Arguments Against It, 37 ARIz. L. REv. 117, 119 (1995)
(noting that "most legal practice throughout the world treats failed and successful attempts quite
differently"). Because virtually every jurisdiction imposes greater punishment for murder than at-
tempted murder, then a fortiori virtually every jurisdiction will punish murder more than threats to
murder.
249. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1 explanatory note ("Robbery ... is distinguished from
extortion by the immediacy ... of the threat."); LAFAVE, supra note 28, at 874 ("[lIt is the immediacy
of the threat that escalates the theft from extortion to robbery.") (footnotes omitted); ROBINSON, supra
note 28, at 788 ("Where the actor causes or threatens immediate serious bodily injury, the offense is
robbery .... Where the actor threatens less than serious bodily injury or threatens future injury ... the
offense is extortion.").
250. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1(b), (c) (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985)
(requiring a threat of "immediate serious bodily injury" or a threat to "immediately ... commit any
felony of the first or second degree"); LAFAVE, supra note 28, at 873-74 ("The traditional view is that
the threat must be of immediate harm, rather than of future harm. Some modem statutes are somewhat
ambiguous on this point, but most of them expressly state that the threat must be as to 'immediate' or
'imminent' harm.") (footnotes omitted); ROBINSON, supra note 28, at 781 (noting that robbery, under the
Model Penal Code, requires a threat of "immediate" force).
251. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1(2) (grading robbery as a felony of the first or second
degree); id. § 223.1(2)(a), (b) (grading extortion by theft as either a third degree felony or a
misdemeanor); LAFAVE, supra note 28, at 880 (explaining that extortion statutes "generally [carry] a
penalty less severe than for robbery").
252. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1 explanatory note ("Robbery ... is distinguished from
extortion by the immediacy ... of the threat."); LAFAvE, supra note 28, at 881 (noting, for example,
that "a threat to kill the victim in the future, unless money is paid the threatener, constitutes the crime of
extortion"); ROBINSON, supra note 28, at 781 (explaining that extortion, under the Model Penal Code,
encompasses a "threat to use force at some future time").
253. For example, if I threaten to commit the crime of murder my conduct may qualify as the
misdemeanor of simple assault, see supra note 246, or the third-degree felony of making a terroristic
threat, see supra note 247. But if rather than merely threatening to commit the crime of murder I
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same reason that a threat to commit crime X is less serious than committing
crime X-the harm is more remote, indirect, and attenuated.
That the harm in a threat to threaten is more remote and indirect may also be
seen as a function of the increased uncertainty of, and the additional step
required for, the harm coming to fruition. If the harm of a threat to commit
crime X is placing the recipient in fear that X will occur, the harm of a threat to
threaten to commit crime X is more remote and indirect, because it requires an
additional step in order for X to occur. Upon issuance of a threat to commit
crime X, the threatener need only take one more step-commit crime X. In
contrast, upon issuance of a threat to threaten to commit crime X, the threatener
must take two more steps-issue the final threat and commit crime X. Just as
there is some uncertainty upon issuance of a threat to commit crime X whether
the threatener will actually commit crime X, there is an additional layer of
uncertainty upon the issuance of a threat to threaten to commit crime X; not
only may the threatener not commit crime X, but also the threatener might not
even issue the final threat. Because of the additional step required in a threat to
threaten for the ultimate harm to come to fruition, there is greater uncertainty
(and thus, lower probability), ceteris paribus, that it will come to fruition. Thus,
a threat to threaten should be considered a less serious level of criminality than
a threat.
A similar analysis demonstrates that the harm of meta-blackmail (as a
conditional threat to threaten), is of greater uncertainty and lower probability
than conventional blackmail (as a conditional threat). Upon issuing the conven-
tional blackmail proposal, the blackmailer has only one step remaining-
disclosing the secret. In contrast, upon issuing a meta-blackmail proposal, the
meta-blackmailer has two steps remaining-issue the final conditional threat
(the conventional blackmail proposal) and disclose the secret. Because of the
additional step required in meta-blackmail for the ultimate harm to come to
fruition, there is greater uncertainty (and thus, lower probability), ceteris pari-
bus, that it will come to fruition. Because the harm in meta-blackmail is of
greater uncertainty and lower probability, ceteris paribus, than in conventional
blackmail, the substantivist approach considers meta-blackmail a less serious
level of criminality than conventional blackmail.
B. PUZZLES
Treating meta-blackmail as a less serious level of criminality than conven-
tional blackmail is supported by (i) the substantivist interpretive strategy, (ii) the
harm of a threat to threaten being more indirect, remote, and attenuated than a
threat, and (iii) the intuition that a proposal threatening a comparatively less
direct and less immediate harm is, ceteris paribus, a less serious level of
criminality. This support would seem to make the substantivist approach a
actually commit the crime of murder my conduct may qualify as the more serious criminal offense
category of first-degree felony. See supra note 245.
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plausible, if not compelling, way to comparatively assess meta-blackmail and
conventional blackmail.
Despite this support, however, the substantivist approach generates two
puzzles due to its conflict with the other two approaches. First, by virtue of its
conflict with the formalist approach, how can a conditional threat to commit an
unlawful act be, ceteris paribus, less serious than a conditional threat to commit
a lawful act. If anything, we might think, at least from a formalistic perspective,
the relationship should be reversed. Robbery is considered a more serious crime
than blackmail precisely because robbery threatens an unlawful act and black-
mail does not. In addition, meta-blackmail, but not conventional blackmail, may
be classified or graded as the greater crime of robbery.254 Because meta-
blackmail qualifies as a greater crime than conventional blackmail, how can
meta-blackmail be treated as if it were a lesser crime than conventional black-
mail? Of course, a substantivist might reply, just as the functionalist might,2 5
that this is puzzling only from the perspective of an empty, legalistic formalism.
But the puzzle may be expressed in nonformalistic terms: how can a conditional
threat to commit a more serious act be a less serious level of criminality, ceteris
paribus, than a conditional threat to commit a less serious act?256 Second, by
virtue of the substantivist approach's conflict with the functionalist approach,
how can meta-blackmail be less serious than conventional blackmail when the
two proposals are functionally equivalent?
V. CONSIDERING THE THREE APPROACHES
A. HARMONIZING BLACKMAIL WITH ROBBERY
Harmonizing blackmail with robbery does not favor a particular approach to
the comparative assessment of meta-blackmail and conventional blackmail.
That meta-blackmail qualifies as robbery in some jurisdictions257 is consistent
with the formalist approach of treating meta-blackmail as more serious. But
treating meta-blackmail as more serious is inconsistent with meta-robbery being
less than or equal in seriousness to conventional robbery.258 The functionalist
and substantivist approaches of treating meta-blackmail as equivalent to, or less
serious than, conventional blackmail are consistent with meta-robbery being
equivalent to, or less serious than, conventional robbery. But the functionalist
254. See supra Part II.A. 1.
255. For a discussion of the functionalist's reply to the puzzle, as expressed in formalistic terms,
generated by the functionalist approach's conflict with the formalistic approach, see supra text
following note 236. For a discussion of the puzzle, expressed in nonformalistic terms, generated by the
functionalist approach's conflict with the formalistic approach, see supra notes 237-42 and accompany-
ing text.
256. That is, how can meta-blackmail (threatening the more serious act of blackmail) be a less
serious level of criminality, ceteris paribus, than blackmail (threatening the less serious act of disclosing
another's embarrassing secret)?
257. See supra Part II.A.1.
258. See supra text accompanying notes 229-31.
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and substantivist approaches are inconsistent with meta-blackmail constituting
the greater offense of robbery in some jurisdictions. Opting for either the
functionalist or substantivist approach would necessitate a significant revision
of robbery statutes in at least four jurisdictions. 259 As a result, none of the
approaches to meta-blackmail would harmonize blackmail with robbery.
B. RESOLVING THE PUZZLE OF BLACKMAIL'S CRIMINALIZATION
Of the three approaches, the functionalist approach yields perhaps the best
prospects for a justification of conventional blackmail's criminalization. If
conventional blackmail and meta-blackmail are functionally equivalent, then
conventional blackmail is functionally equivalent to a proposal containing an
unlawful threatened act (meta-blackmail). And the justification for criminalizing
proposals containing an unlawful threatened act is considered unproblematic. 26 °
The justification for robbery's criminalization applies equally to meta-
blackmail. The unproblematic justification for the criminalization of robbery is
that obtaining the property of another by the utterance of a threat to condition-
ally commit an unlawful act constitutes a wrongful harm.26 1 In other words, it is
the unlawfulness of the threatened act that makes robbery a legally cognizable
wrongful harm and supplies a permissible, uncontroversial basis for criminaliz-
ing robbery. The rationale for criminalizing robbery is thus a function of the
unlawfulness of what is threatened. As one commentator notes, "it is relatively
unproblematic to outlaw the making of a threat to do something that is ille-
gal."262 Consider the following rationale for robbery's criminalization, as con-
trasted with blackmail, expressed as a function of the robber selling something
he does not own:
For the robber's wrong-his boundary-crossing-is easy to pinpoint. He sells
back what he doesn't own, the victim's life and limb. Not so the blackmailer
threatening to disclose the victim's infidelity. The victim doesn't own the right
to control the blackmailer's communication with his wife; the blackmailer
does. The blackmailer, unlike the robber, is selling something he owns. 26 3
This rationale can be easily restated so as to justify meta-blackmail's criminaliza-
tion. For the meta-blackmailer's wrong-her boundary crossing-is easy to
pinpoint. She sells back what she does not own-the victim's right to be free of
being threatened with the crime of blackmail. This rationale for robbery is no
different than the proffered justification for criminalizing meta-blackmail; both
259. See supra Part II.A. 1.
260. See supra notes 27, 29-30 and accompanying text; infra notes 261-65 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 29-30; see also Lindgren, supra note 1, at 671 n.7 (explaining that if an act is
unlawful, no one has the right to commit that act and, therefore, "no one should be allowed to profit by
selling a right the law prohibits").
262. Smith, supra note 20, at 864; see also supra notes 27, 29-30.
263. Katz, supra note 6, at 1576.
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obtain property via the threat of an unlawful act, "by selling a right the law
prohibits," 264 and by selling something the threatener does not own.
265
Because the justification for criminalizing proposals containing an unlawful
threatened act is unproblematic, and conventional blackmail proposals are
functionally equivalent to such proposals, the justification for the criminaliza-
tion of conventional blackmail proposals must be similarly unproblematic.
Formally, conventional blackmail threatens a lawful act. But if functionally
equivalent to meta-blackmail, conventional blackmail is functionally equivalent
to threats to commit unlawful acts. The puzzle of blackmail-why it can be a
crime to threaten to conditionally do what may lawfully be done-is thereby
seemingly resolved. The puzzle of blackmail is only a puzzle from a formalistic
perspective. From a functionalist perspective, conventional blackmail threatens
an unlawful act.
The premise that affords the resolution of the puzzle of blackmail-the
equivalence of conventional blackmail and meta-blackmail-is, however, un-
clear. For the asserted resolution of the puzzle of blackmail to be persuasive,
two arguments are required: showing that the functional equivalence of conven-
tional blackmail and meta-blackmail trumps both (i) the formal differences
between the proposals suggesting meta-blackmail is more serious, and (ii) the
substantive differences between the two proposals suggesting meta-blackmail is
less serious. If those two arguments can be made, then the equivalence of
conventional blackmail proposals and proposals containing threats to do unlaw-
ful acts (meta-blackmail) supplies the missing link between the coercion in
conventional blackmail proposals and the "plain vanilla" coercion 266 found in
threats to do unlawful acts, as well as the missing link between blackmail and
offenses such as robbery for which criminalization is unproblematic.
Although the functionalist perspective may provide a technical solution to the
puzzle of blackmail, it is not an altogether satisfactory justification of black-
mail's criminalization. The resolution bootstraps blackmail's existing criminaliza-
tion into a justification of blackmail's criminalization. It fails to explain why
blackmail constitutes a legally cognizable wrongful harm in the first place.267
C. SUPPORTING DECRIMINALIZATION OF BLACKMAIL
None of the three approaches as to how meta-blackmail should be treated
supports decriminalizing blackmail. However, support for decriminalizing black-
mail may be drawn from both the difficulty of choosing among the three
perhaps equally plausible approaches as well as the puzzles and difficulties
generated by each approach. While some of these difficulties may be due to a
264. Lindgren, supra note 1, at 671 n.7.
265. See Katz, supra note 6, at 1576.
266. See id. at 1574.
267. For a discussion of why a justification for criminalizing a type of conduct must not merely
show that the conduct constitutes a harm but must also show that the conduct constitutes a wrongful
harm, see supra notes 187-92 and accompanying text.
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variety of reasons, decriminalizing blackmail resolves all of the difficulties.
The formalist approach (treating meta-blackmail as more serious) incurs the
puzzle of how a threat to threaten (threatening blackmail) may be classified as a
greater crime, and be more coercive, than a threat (blackmail). Decriminalizing
blackmail resolves the puzzle. By decriminalizing blackmail, a threat to black-
mail would no longer constitute a threat to commit an unlawful act, thereby
eliminating the basis for a threat to blackmail to be classified as the greater
crime, and be more coercive than, blackmail itself. By decriminalizing black-
mail, both threatening blackmail and blackmail itself would be lawful and no
puzzle arises.
The functionalist approach (treating meta-blackmail and conventional black-
mail equivalently) generates the puzzle of how threatening an unlawful act can
be no more serious than threatening a lawful act. Decriminalizing blackmail
eliminates the puzzle. By decriminalizing blackmail, both the threatened act in
meta-blackmail and blackmail itself would be lawful. No puzzle would arise by
treating both meta-blackmail and conventional blackmail as (equivalently) non-
criminal.
The substantivist approach (treating meta-blackmail as less serious) raises the
puzzle of how threatening an unlawful act can be less serious than threatening a
lawful act. Decriminalizing blackmail resolves the puzzle. By decriminalizing
blackmail, threatening to disclose the secret would be lawful. A fortiori, threaten-
ing to threaten to disclose the secret would also be lawful. As a result, no puzzle
arises.
Decriminalizing blackmail neatly resolves the trilemma of meta-blackmail.
At the cost of abandoning the intuition that blackmail is properly criminalized,
we preserve, without conflict, the following three compelling intuitions: (i)
conditionally threatening an unlawful act (or more serious act) is more serious,
ceteris paribus, than conditionally threatening a lawful act (or less serious act),
(ii) functionally equivalent proposals should be treated equivalently, and (iii)
conditionally threatening to threaten (or conditionally threatening a less direct
and less immediate harm) is less serious, ceteris paribus, than conditionally
threatening (or conditionally threatening a more direct and immediate harm).
If, instead, we wish to preserve the intuition that blackmail is properly
criminalized, the cost of doing so is that any two of the above three compelling
intuitions must be abandoned. That is, if we do not opt to resolve the trilemma
by decriminalizing blackmail, the trilemma must be resolved by opting for one
of the three possible approaches. But opting for one of the possible approaches
entails abandoning the intuitions supporting the two rejected approaches. For
example, suppose we opt for the functionalist approach of treating meta-
blackmail and conventional blackmail equivalently. The cost of doing so is that
we abandon the two intuitions supporting the formalist and substantivist ap-
proaches. And these two intuitions are the very principles by which we differen-
tiate robbery from blackmail and extortion. Robbery is considered the more
serious crime, because (i) it threatens a more serious act (typically death or
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serious bodily harm), and (ii) the threatened act is typically required to be
threatened to be carried out immediately.268 The cost of preserving our intuition
that blackmail is properly criminalized and resolving the trilemma by, for
example, opting for the functionalist approach, is the abandonment of the two
intuitions or principles underlying the differentiation of robbery from blackmail
and extortion. But this cost may be too high. The intuitions that must be
abandoned to preserve our intuition that blackmail is properly criminalized are
more valuable and compelling than our intuition that blackmail is properly
criminalized.
For both quantitative and qualitative reasons, decriminalizing blackmail is the
preferable resolution to the trilemma. Because the intuition that blackmail is
properly criminalized has stubbornly resisted justification, despite extraordinary
scholarly attention, we might be skeptical about that intuition's validity. There-
fore, the validity of the other three intuitions may trump the validity of the
intuition that blackmail is properly criminalized. As a result, to preserve the
qualitatively more-valuable intuitions, blackmail should be decriminalized. And
even if we assume that the value of each intuition is the same,269 resolving the
trilemma by decriminalizing blackmail preserves a greater number of compel-
ling intuitions.270
CONCLUSION
Justifying blackmail's prohibition has proven elusive because it conflicts with
the intuition that what one has the right to do, one has the right to conditionally
threaten to do. The comparative assessment of proposals threatening blackmail
(meta-blackmail) with proposals of blackmail itself reveals that the law of
blackmail is even more puzzling than previously realized. The trilemma of
meta-blackmail demonstrates that criminalizing blackmail also conflicts with
any two of the following three compelling intuitions: (i) conditionally threaten-
ing to commit an unlawful act (or a more serious act) is a more serious level of
criminality, ceteris paribus, than conditionally threatening to commit a lawful
act (or a less serious act), (ii) functionally equivalent proposals should be
treated equivalently, and (iii) conditionally threatening to threaten (or condition-
ally threatening a less direct and immediate harm) is less serious, ceteris
paribus, than conditionally threatening (or conditionally threatening a more
direct and immediate harm). Criminalizing blackmail violates intuitions that are
268. See supra notes 28, 249-52.
269. And this is most likely a dubious assumption.
270. The option of decriminalizing blackmail preserves the three compelling intuitions underlying
the trilemma at the cost of abandoning the intuition that blackmail is properly criminalized for a net
gain of two compelling intuitions preserved. The option of continuing to criminalize blackmail
preserves the intuition that blackmail is properly criminalized and one of the three compelling intuitions
underlying the trilemma at the cost of abandoning two of the three compelling intuitions underlying the
trilemma for a net gain of zero compelling intuitions. Thus, decriminalizing blackmail preserves more
compelling intuitions than continuing to criminalize blackmail.
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more compelling than the intuition that blackmail is properly criminalized.
Consequently, blackmail should be decriminalized. But, understandably, the
intuition that blackmail is properly criminalized dies hard. If we wish to
continue criminalizing blackmail, justifying that criminalization-already "one
of the most elusive intellectual puzzles in all of law' 2 7 I-just got harder.
271. Lindgren, supra note 2, at 1975.
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